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Pokorak: "Death Stands Condemned:" Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty

'[DEATH STANDS CONDEMNED:" JUSTICE BRENNAN
AND THE DEATH PENALTY

JEFFREY J. POKORAK"

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
-Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken

INTRODUCTION

Now that Justice William Brennan has retired from his position on the United
States Supreme Court,1 his opinions may be examined with the advantage of
hindsight. Justice Brennan was responsible for some of the most momentous
decisions of his age in some of the most publicly debated constitutional areas.
Freedom of the press,2 freedom of speech,3 voting rights, 4 school desegregation, s welfare rights for the poor,6 affirmative action,7 the application of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to criminal cases, 8 the right to

*
Supervising Attorney for St. Mary's University School of Law Capital Punishment Clinic;
Senior Staff Attorney for the Texas Appellate Practice and Educational Resource Center;, J.D.,
Northeastern University School of Law, 1984.
1.
In 1956, William J.Brennan Jr. was appointed to the United States Supreme Court by
President Eisenhower to succeed Justice Minton; in July of 1990, Justice Brennan announced his
retirement from the Court.
2.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (criminalization of flag desecration prohibited by
the first amendment).
4.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that apportionment decisions are not purely
political and are thus justiciable); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (allowing Congress,
under Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, to prohibit English literacy voting requirements).
5.
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down freedom of choice
school districting); Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (northern school district de facto
unconstitutionally segregated).
6.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding welfare is a property right protected by
the due process clause).
7.
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding voluntary
affirmative action plan); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (same);
Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers, Intl Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (upholding courtimposed numerical goals and time tables); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (same).
8.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring, as a constitutional matter, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 2, Art. 3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW[V

[Vol. 27

monetary damages for violations of the Constitution, 9 and the application of the
fifth amendment to the states, 10 are just a few of the vital constitutional issues
where Justice Brennan's thoughts and words became law.
During Justice Brennan's tenure, the Court also developed a body of
constitutional standards and limitations on death penalty administration. The
"cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the eighth amendment became the
constitutional vehicle for federal supervisory control of the states' administration
of capital cases. Justice Brennan was an early leader in the fight for increased
rationality and procedural regularity under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in the states' administration of their death penalty
schemes." He also was instrumental, in 1972, in convincing a majority of the
Court that the application of the eighth amendment to the states' capital
sentencing systems required their dissolution and the reversal of all extant
sentences of death.12
This constitutional ban only lasted four years. When the Supreme Court
decided in 1976 that the states could administer the death penalty applying
specific constitutional limitations," the unique aspect of Justice Brennan's
opinions regarding capital punishment was revealed. He stood against the
imposition of the death penalty at any time for any reason in the United States
finding that the death penalty was, in all circumstances, cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Constitution. 4 Justice Brennan's opinions-concurrences and dissents-largely defined the legal debate over the role of the
federal government in the administration of states' death penalty systems. His
unswerving adherence to an abolitionist view also gave moral substance to
federal regulatory intervention.
This Article will first examine Justice Brennan's involvement in the Court's
increased application of specific constitutional principles to states' capital
punishment schemes. It will digest the early history of the Court's willingness
to impose federal controls in this area, and will follow Justice Brennan's role in
death penalty jurisprudence through Furman v. Georgia. After the Court reinstated the death penalty, Justice Brennan continued to struggle for open
federal forums for death penalty litigants in federal habeas corpus. The Article
will discuss some of his most significant dissents to the Court's limitation of
federal forums for redress of constitutional rights. Finally, Justice Brennan's
continued commitment to the applicability of federal standards of rationality and

9.
Bivensv. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
implied right of action for violations of the fourth amendment); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services,
6 U.S. 658 (1978) (the availability of monetary damages from local governments and officials

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
10.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (application of fifth amendment protections through
the fourteenth amendment to state criminal proceedings).
11.
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1971).
12. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
13. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
14. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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reviewability of states' death penalty convictions and sentences will be explored
through his dissent in the most recent systemic constitutional challenge to the
death penalty: McCleskey v. Kemp. 5
Justice Brennan's death penalty opinions explored the relationship between the
federal Constitution, the federal judiciary, and the states' mandatory compliance
with constitutional limitations. They demonstrated his unswerving allegiance to
open and liberal federal review, continued faith in those evolving standards of
civilization that respect the dignity of humanity, and, most importantly, a
profound commitment to each individual before the Court who was condemned
to die.
I. FEDERALIZATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY: THE ROAD TO GREGG

In 1956, the year that William Brennan was appointed to the Supreme Court,
there were sixty-five executions in the United States.16 Over the next twenty
years, this country witnessed profound changes in the administration of capital
punishment in the country. The most important of these was the application of
federal constitutional principles and standards, developed from the eighth and
fourteenth amendments, to the administration of states' death penalty system.
In applying constitutional requirements to death penalty trials, the Court began
a process of standardizing the law applicable to all states' capital punishment
systems. Parallel to that development was the necessary increase in federal
habeas corpus review of death penalty cases to ensure the states' compliance with
the newly applied rights. Justice Brennan was a chief proponent of this process
of federalization.
The development and application of constitutional requirements demanded by
the eighth and fourteenth amendments to every death penalty trial in the United
States took years to develop. The original suggestion that the eighth amendment
might apply to states' death penalty schemes 17 was followed by an increased
application of due process principles to the trials of capital cases. 8 This early
process of increased federal review and standardization was culminated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia. 9 Justice Brennan was among
the five member plurality that held all existing capital punishment schemes
violated the eighth amendment's proscription against "cruel and unusual
punishment. "2° The states' response to the apparent dissolution of the death
penalty was swift. Over the next four years, thirty-five jurisdictions enacted
death penalty statutes which they hoped were constitutional. In 1976, a mere

15.

481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987).

16.
Brennan, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Death Penalty:A View From the Court, 100
HARV. L. REv. 313, 313 (1986).
17.

See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissent to the denial of certiorari).

18.

See, eg, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).

19.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).

20.
'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII.
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four years after Furman,the Supreme Court revisited the issue. Faced with new
and innovative statutory schemes designed to address previous
constitutional
2
objections, the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty. '
A. Increased Supreme CourtScrutiny: The Sixties
The history of this process implicates the whole of current capital punishment
jurisprudence. During the first years of Justice Brennan's tenure, the death
penalty was a topic that "had received relatively little attention from the courts
and that was not, at the time, an issue upon which either litigants or the press
had begun to focus."2 In 1963, Justice Goldberg circulated a "highly unusual"
memorandum to the members of the Court relating to six pending petitions for
writ of certiorari in capital cases.2 The memorandum urged the Court to grant
certiorari in the cases to address the issue of the constitutionality of death as a
penalty under the eighth amendment. 24 Although certiorari vas not granted in
any of these cases, Justice Goldberg issued a dissent from the denial of certiorari
in one of the cases, Rudolph v. Alabama? The dissent was joined by Justices
Douglas and Brennan.26 The focus of the Rudolph dissent was not the abolition
of the death penalty, but rather the more focused issue of the constitutionality
of the death penalty for someone convicted of rape, not murder? As is often
the case with opinions issued from the Supreme Court, the Rudolph dissent was
a signal to litigants that the constitutionality of at least certain aspects of the
death penalty in America was ripe for attack.
Apart from providing notice of possible avenues of appeal, the Rudolph dissent
also began the process of federalizing the death penalty. In the first question
which the dissenters sought to address, they queried whether the execution of
an individual convicted of rape violated the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of [our] maturing society"2 or "standards of decency more
or less universally accepted. 30 This language highlighted their opinion that the
eighth amendment was flexible, and signalled its inevitable application to the

21.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
22. Brennan, supra note 16, at 315.
23.
Id. at 314.
24.
Id. at 315.
25.
375 U.S. 889 (1963).
26.
Brennan, supra note 16, at 315.
27. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889-91. The issue of whether the death penalty for rape was
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment was not finally addressed until after Gregg See Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape of adult female violates eighth amendment
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments).
28. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889-90.
29. Id. at 890 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (opinion of Warren, CJ.)).
30.
Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947)) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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states' management of capital punishment. 31 Regardless of what standard the
Court ultimately chose to apply to the eighth amendment, three Justices
in 1963
3
were presenting that application to the states as a fait accompli. 2
The federalization of the states' death penalty law and litigation of the issues
first suggested in the Rudolph dissent did not begin in earnest until the 1967
term. In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Witherspoon v. Illinois.33 Justice
Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court and Justice Brennan joined.Y The issue
before the Court was whether the sixth amendment prohibited the exclusion of
jurors in a death penalty case who had "conscientious scruples against capital
punishment."35 The Court addressed the impact this death qualification practice
had on the likelihood of a death sentence.m Under the Illinois capital
sentencing structure in question, the jury was required to decide both guilt and
punishment in a unified proceeding.3 If the jury concluded that the defendant
was guilty of the capital crime charged, then it decided, without the benefit of
any further proceeding, whether the defendant should be executed. 8 The Court
recognized that excluding all jurors who merely had "conscientious scruples
against capital punishment,"3 9 "armed the prosecution with unlimited challenges
for cause," 40 and "produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die."4' Therefore, the Court held that the practice of death-qualifying juries

31.
Although nowhere cited in the Rudolph dissent, the Supreme Court had first held, only
four months earlier, that the eighth amendment's bar to cruel and unusual punishment was applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson struck down a statute requiring incarceration for the status crime of
narcotics addiction as inflicting a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 667. The expansion of this rather minor incursion into states' criminal justice
administration to include the elimination of rape as a capital offense is quite remarkable.
32. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889. The three questions that Justices Goldberg, Douglas, and
Brennan would have considered were prefaced with the general issue of "Whether the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution permit the imposition of the death penalty
on a convicted rapist who has neither taken nor endangered human life." Id
33.
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 512 (quoting ILL REv. STAT. c. 38, § 743 (1959)). The facts in Witherspoon illustrate
the problem. The trial judge stated early in the voir dire process: 1et's get these conscientious
objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on them." Id. at 514. The state thereafter
successfully excluded forty-seven venirepersons because of their attitudes regarding capital
punishment. Id.
36.
Although the petitioner, Witherspoon, urged the Court to find that such death qualification
of the jury infected their ability to properly adduce guilt or innocence, the Court declined to do so.
Id. at 516-18. This issue was ultimately decided adversely to the capital defendant 18 years later in
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
37. Id. at 518.
38. Id. The unified or unitary capital punishment scheme, with guilt and punishment decided
in the same jury deliberation, soon became the focus both of abolitionist arguments and the Court's
concern. See infra notes 49-53, 64-66 and accompanying text.
39. Id. at 512.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 521 (footnote omitted).
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based on conscientious scruples violated the sixth amendment.42 In so doing,
the Court created a broad standard applicable to the qualification of jurors in
all death penalty trials-all that could be required of jurors was a willingness "to
consider all the penalties provided by state law."43 If the state allowed, the
exclusion of jurors "on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be
carried out... ."44 The decision specifically was limited to the sentence and
not the conviction.4 Also, the Court emphasized that its "decision in this case
[did not] affect the validity of any sentence other than one of death."46
The flood of cases in the wake of Witherspoon cannot be underestimated;
thousands of inmates sought relief on grounds of improper juror exclusion 7
This, however, was just the beginning of increased federal control of state death
penalty administration. In the next term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Maxwell v. Bishop.4 The first issue presented in Maxwell was whether, in a
unified death penalty trial, the fifth and fourteenth amendments "impermissibly
penalized the accused's assertion of his constitutional rights by forcing him to
choose between remaining silent to protect his innocence and presenting
evidence to mitigate his potential punishment."49 The second issue presented

42.
Id. at 518 C'[I]t
is self-evident that, in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed,
this jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments.").
43. Id. at 522-23 n.21.
44. Id. In the now-famous footnote 21 of Witherspoon, the Court created a stringent test for
federal review of claims of improper juror removal. The Court stated that veniremen excluded for
cause could only be those:
[W]ho made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automaticaly vote against the
imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be
developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt
Id. (emphasis in original).
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis in original). This construction prefigures the jurisprudence of heightened
reliability that is now a recognized aspect of the modern death penalty. See, eg., Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Beck v.Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977).
47.
See Amsterdam, In Favoum Moris: The Supreme CourtandCapitalPunishment,14 HUMAN
RIGOrS 14, 49 (1987). Amsterdam estimates the number of death sentence reversals on Witherspoon
grounds to be between twelve and thirteen hundred cases. Id. Witherspoon was fully retroactive to
cases that were already in federal habeas corpus proceedings because of the Court's holding that "a
death sentence cannot be carried out" if a jury was thus composed. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.
21. This retroactivity applied to the punishment phase might have a very different outcome today.
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity is threshold issue that bars federal postconviction relief based on "new rules" except in narrow exceptions); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S.CL 2822
(1990) (finding jury argument error a "new rule" to which no exception applies); Saffie v. Parks, 110
S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (punishment phase instruction claim a "new rule" to which no exception applied);
Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212 (1990) (finding confession claim a "new rule" to which no
exception applied). But see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (punishment claim regarding the
jury's ability to fully consider and give effect to mitigating evidence not a "new rule").
48.
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). See Brennan, supra note 16, at 316.
49.
Brennan, supra note 16, at 316.
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in Maxwell was whether the delegation of absolute discretion to the jury in
deciding punishment violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause."
In Maxwell, the Supreme Court's attention was directed to the issue of the
applicability of the fifth amendment51 and the fourteenth amendment due
process clause52 to the punishment aspect of a state capital proceeding. As a
result, the Court was drawn into a debate over the regulation and federalization
of all capital proceedings. Justice Brennan, in his 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Lecture, described the initial discussions of Maxwell:
The conference vote was eight to one to reverse the court of appeals
and vacate the sentence of death, but the discussion generated a
variety of views, and it was not clear whether there were five votes for
any single rationale. Shortly thereafter, Justice Harlan, who had
expressed at conference his view that the unitary procedure was, in
this context, a violation of due process, circulated a note to all of us
suggesting that he was having second thoughts and that perhaps the
case should be discussed again at conference. The second conference
clarified each Justice's position. Chief Justice Warren, Justice
Douglas, and I agreed that the submission to the jury of the question
of whether to impose death without also providing the jury preexisting standards to guide its deliberations violates due process. We also
agreed, and were joined on this point by Justices Fortas and
Marshall, that a bifurcated trial is constitutionally required in a
capital case; thus, there was a Court for this position. Although not
firmly committed, Justice Harlan was inclined to be a sixth vote on
this issue. Justice Stewart, who had written Witherspoon, thought that
Maxwell should be disposed of on the basis of Witherspoon. Justice
White agreed. Justice Black was alone in dissent. The Chief
assigned the opinion to Justice Douglas, who soon circulated a draft

50.
Id. The same term, the Court granted certiorari in Boykin v. Alabama in which the
petitioner challenged the constitutional basis of state authority to impose the death penalty for armed
robbery. Id. In Boykin, a twenty-seven year old black man was charged with five counts of common
law robbery which was a capital offense. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The defendant
was indigent and had counsel appointed who, at arraignment three days later, promptly had the
defendant plead guilty to all pending charges. Id. After a seemingly cursory proceeding, a jury
empaneled for punishment purposes only convicted the defendant and sentenced him to die for each
of the charges. Id. at 240. The defendant, on automatic appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court,
attacked the constitutionality of his death sentence for common law robbery under the United States
Constitution's eighth amendment bar to cruel and unusual punishments. Id. The Alabama Supreme
Court rejected the claim, and the defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. In an opinion delivered by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court avoided the broad

constitutional challenge and reversed the case on the narrow ground that the trial court failed to make
an affirmative showing that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowingly and intelligently entered. Id.

at 241-42.
"No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
51.
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.

52.
"No State shall make or enforce any law which ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV.
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opinion reversing the lower court judgment on both the standards
and bifurcation issues 3
This description presents an image of the Warren Court's last moments, poised
to act as it had many times before by requiring an overlay of federal constitutional principles to state court criminal proceedings. The federal constitutional
standard of due process would require, at a minimum, a bifurcated sentencing
proceeding in state capital cases. Presumably, issues regarding which due process
rights would apply, out of the large panoply developed over the previous two
decades, was left for arguments of future defendants. Three Justices, including
Justice Brennan, at that time also would have required specific standardsunder
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to insure that a death sentence would not
be completely discretionary and thus would be rationally reviewable. Only
Justice Black stood for affirmance. The Maxwell Court composition did not last
long enough for its hopeful promise to approach fruition.
Because it was clear that five votes did not exist for the "standardless
sentencing" ground for reversal, Justice Douglas wrote a second draft opinion in
order to reverse the case solely on the unified proceeding challenge.5 4 Since
Justice Brennan had come to believe firmly in the need for reviewable standards
by which persons are condemned to die, he prepared a concurring opinion in
which he argued that "the most elementary requirement 6f due process is that
judicial determinations concerning life or liberty must be based on pre-existing
standards of law and cannot be left to the unlimited discretion of a judge or
"

jury. 55

By the time the revisions and the concurring opinions had been prepared, the
Court began a most unexpected change. Chief Justice Warren's hand-picked
successor, Justice Abe Fortas, resigned from the Court.56 This left Justice
Harlan as the crucial fifth vote for a Court which supported reversal on the due
process requirement of a bifurcated proceeding in capital cases. As previously
stated, Justice Harlan indicated his support for reversal on due process grounds,
but after preparing a concurring opinion supporting the now slipping majority,
he urged the Court to hear reargument in Maxwell.57 Once the suggestion was
made for reargument, effectively putting off the decision until the next term, the
original six person majority was further eroded by the retirement of Chief Justice
Warren.5 8

Brennan, supra note 16, at 316.

53.
54.

Id. at 317.

55.

Id. (citing B. SCHwARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 399, 431

(1985)).
56. Justice Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court on May 14, 1969. He was not replaced
until June 9, 1970, when Justice Blackmun took the oath of office.
Brennan, supra note 16, at 317. The Maxwell case was initially argued March 4, 19S9 and
57.
was reargued May 4, 1970. Maxwell, 398 U.S. at 262.
Chief Justice Warren retired from the Supreme Court on June 23, 1969. Warren E.
58.
Burger replaced him as Chief Justice, taking the oath of office on the same day Chief Justice Warren
stepped down.
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The loss of Fortas and Warren during the pendency of the Maxwell case, and
the ultimate ideological change that their replacements occasioned, profoundly
altered the gradual move of the Court towards federal standardization and
oversight of state administered death penalty trials. Beyond the shift in available
votes for any particular proposition, a new leadership role developed for Justice
Brennan. Already favoring a position of further federal constitutional
standardization and regulation, Justice Brennan to this point had been willing
to join his vote with the Senior Justices, when decisions were drafted. The
resignation of Justice Fortas and the retirement of Chief Justice Warren
propelled Justice Brennan into the front of the debate over the uncertain future
of constitutional oversight of the states' capital punishment laws. Justice
Brennan became a galvanizing voice for federalization and federal court
regulation of state death penalty schemes, through both the eighth and the
fourteenth amendments.
Justice Harlan's desire to reconsider Maxwell, and the loss of Justices Fortas
and Warren, meant a loss of momentum to reverse on either the bifurcated trial
issue or the lack of standards governing the decision of who should die issue.
These changes allowed Justice Stewart's original idea to reverse Maxwell on
Witherspoon grounds to win that day. 59 As for the two issues which Maxwell
was originally intended to decide, 6 the Court specifically expressed "no view
whatever." 61 In a footnote to this abdication, the Court promised to do
tomorrow what it could not do that day. 62
B. Shifting Sands: McGautha
In 1970, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases: McGautha v.
Califomia6 and Crampton v. Ohio.6 McGautha presented the issue whether,
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, "petitioner's
constitutional rights were infringed by permitting the jury to impose the death
penalty without any governing standards."6 Certiorari was granted in Crampton
to decide the same issue as posed in McGautha and the further question of
"whether the jury's imposition of the death sentence in the same proceeding and
verdict as determined the issue of guilt was constitutionally permissible."6
Although these issues already had been discussed and opinions had been written
59. Maxwerl 398 U.S. at 267. Although the Witherspoon issue was never addressed in the
federal courts below, the case was remanded to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for further
consideration of the applicability of Witherspoon.
60.
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
Maxwel, 398 U.S. at 267.
61.

62.

Id. at n.4: We have today granted certiorari in No. 486, Misc., McGautha v. California,and

No. 709, Misc., Crampton v. Ohio, in which these two questions will be considered at an early date
in the 1970 Term."

63.

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).

64.

Id.

65.

Id at 185.

66.

Id.
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for the various positions, the precipitous changes in the Court personnel led to
an abrupt shift in the imposition of federal court standards. In McGautha, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of both the unbridled jury sentencing and the
unitary trial system against fourteenth amendment challenges.67 Writing for the
Court was Justice Harlan, who had earlier been willing to provide a sixth vote
for reversal in Maxwell on the same grounds he now found constitutional.s
Where the path during the Warren years was perhaps constructed with varying
degrees of disagreement among members of the Court regarding the breadth and
compass of the federal regulation of the death penalty, it was, seemingly, a fairly
straight path towards increasing regulation. 69 McGauthai however, deconstructed that path. The new Burger Court, led by Harlan, appeared
responsive to frustrations of creating perfect, reviewable standards. The Court
abandoned the common theme of the Warren Court that federal constitutional
standards could be applied in a beneficent and just manner.
Justice Harlan began his decision with the common claim made in both
McGauthaand Crampton:that due process required objective standards by which
a jury imposed a sentence of death. 70 Perhaps looking well down the road, and
seeing in the Court's path a hill so steep that no brakes could stop the inevitable
slide toward complete constitutional regulation, Justice Harlan chose to turn and
look up at the past. The demise of federal review of state death penalty
practices began in McGautha with a description of the historical basis for the
death penalty, and the emerging tendency towards mercy and away from
mandatory sentencing.71 Justice Harlan completed his overview with the
observation that many challenges to standardless sentencing had been brought
in many courts, yet "[n]o court has held the challenge good."72 As if this were
itself the answer to the constitutional issues presented, Justice Harlan decided
that no decision could be made because any attempt to regulate jury discretion
was doomed. As an example, he pointed to the Model Penal Code's attempt to
Id. at 207, 217.
67.
68.
Id. See also Brennan, supra note 16, at 318 ("Notwithstanding his statement during the
second Maxwell conference that he could not 'imagine a more flagrant denial of due process' than the
unitary trial, Justice Harlan wrote the opinion for the Court [in McGautha] sustaining the validity of
such trials.").
69. Justice Stewart's opinions during this period are illustrative of the 'middle ground' of
constitutional intervention in the states' administration of death penalty trials. The author of
Witherspoon, Justice Stewart was willing to impose some substantial and intrusive requirements on
death penalty trials. His footnotes in that case also indicate a deeply troubled conscience regarding
the imposition of a sentence of death by a "jury [which] can speak only for a distinct and dwindling
minority." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520. However, in Maxwell, Justice Stewart was only willing to
reverse on the narrow ground of Witherspoon error rather than invalidate, in one frontal attack, the
unitary trial system under the fourteenth amendment. See Brennan, supra note 16, at 316. Finally,
Justice Stewart was silently supportive of the McGautha majority in its rejection of the broad
fourteenth amendment challenges to the death penalty procedures per se. See infra notes 82-88 and
accompanying text. For an illuminating analysis of Justice Stewart's possible ideological reasons for
these decisions, see Burt, Disorderin the Court. The DeathPenalty and the Constitution, 85 MiCH.L.
REV.1741, 1772-80 (1987).
70. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 197-203.
71.
72.
Id. at 203.
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channel juror discretion in capital cases?73 Finding incomplete this quasi-

73. Id. at 205-07 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
The MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962, as revised July 30,1962) is included
in toto as an appendix to the Court's opinion in McGautha.
One of the central concepts underlying the Model Code, was the presumption against the death
penalty. The statute afforded the opportunity to exclude the death penalty at three distinct stages of
trial. First, if a defendant had been convicted of murder, the death penalty was "excluded" if the court
determined that any of the following factors existed:
(a) none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3) of this Section was
established by the evidence at trial or will be established if further proceedings are initiated
under Subsection (2) of this Section; or
(b) Substantial mitigating circumstances, established by the evidence at the trial, call for
leniency; or
(c) the defendant, with the consent of the prosecution attorney and the approval of the
Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the first degree; or
(d) The defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime; or
(e) the defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or
(1) although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not foreclose all doubt
respecting the defendant's guilt.
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 222 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)). If the court found none of
these factors precluded the death penalty, then a separate punishment phase hearing was held. Id.
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2)). At this punishment hearing, any evidence, relevant to
sentence, could be presented unless legally prohibited. Id. at 223 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.6(2)). At the hearing the jury was directed to consider a list of delineated aggravating
circumstances and a list of mitigating circumstances:
(3) Aggravating Circumstances.
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice
in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting
to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force,
arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity.
(4) Mitigating Circumstances.
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to
the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to
provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and
his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f)The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
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legislative attempt at creating guidelines for death penalty jurors, Justice Harlan
rejected the project as impossible. 74 For Justice Harlan and the Court, the lack
of complete specificity in the Model Penal Code's instruction to consider
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, bore "witness to the intractable nature
of the problem of 'standards' which the history of capital punishment has from
the beginning reflected."75
Without any favorable ruling from any other court on petitioners' plea for jury
standards, and without an example before the Court of what those standards
should be, Justice Harlan took a giant step backwards, refusing to "pronounce
at large that standards in this realm are constitutionally required." 76 Justice
Harlan then made the ultimate statement of abdication of federal review of the
death penalty:
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human
knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or
77
death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.
The impossibility of perfect regulation therefore made any regulation, any
attempt at improvement, of no constitutional concern. Instead, the Court
constructed an elaborate layering of presumptions and assumptions relying on
the good faith of jurors and the quality and effective assistance of defense
counsel.
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly
awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act
with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will
consider a variety of factors, many of which will have been suggested
by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel. 78
This system surrendered all constitutional due process review to the states'
entitlement to assume that all of these advantages would accrue to every
defendant on trial for his life. It further assumed that counsel, in most cases
appointed, would effectively present all possible evidence and argument on

(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. at 224-25 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) & (4)). Death could not be imposed unless
at least one aggravating circumstance was found to exist and "there were no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Id. at 224 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2)).Even
then, the court apparently retained the discretion to reject the jury's sentence of death in favor of a
life sentence. Id. at 223-24 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2)).
74.
McGautha,402 U.S. at 206 n.16.
75.
Id. at 207.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
Id. at 208.
78.
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behalf of a client. Finally, it assumed that jurors would not base their decisions
on clearly unconstitutional considerations, such as race or mental illness.' Yet,
in the scheme under review in McGautha the very issue was whether this
construct of assumptions was in fact true. The conclusion that due process did
not require standards because the states may presume them, was evidence of the
frustration with the whole project of regulation. The very premise of the
McGautha majority-that untrammeled discretion is acceptable because it is
unlikely to be cured-completely negated the Court's other necessary presumption that jurors themselves will regulate their conduct. Therefore, the seemingly
positive conceptualization of a profoundly serious, informed, and mature jury
undertaking the immense task of deciding who lives and who dies, disguised the
much more cynical concept that jurors' discretion can never be regulated to
insure all arbitrary factors are eliminated from deliberations. 80
With the conclusion that the due process clause required no standards in death
penalty sentencing, inertia forced the Court to also reject the claim that due

process required a bifurcated sentencing procedure.81 Again, the Court, led by2
Justice Harlan, recognized the import and scope of the petitioner's argument.
Once the Court abandoned their faith in constitutional regulation or standardization of sentencing procedures, then there could be no claim that a unitary
proceeding was any worse than a bifurcated proceeding. The tension complained
of by the petitioner in Cramptons was regrettable, but of no constitutional
moment. 84 Therefore, Justice Harlan found that it was "undeniably hard to

79.
See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983): "[itwould be unconstitutional to attach]
the 'aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the
sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant.
. or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the
defendant's mental illness." (citations omitted).
80.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,291 n.7 (1987) (although accepted statistical analysis
shows that race plays some part in capital sentencing, it only indicates a "risk that the factor of race
entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any
particular sentencing decision") (emphasis in original).
81. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 220.
82.
Id. at 210-11. Only the petitioner in Crampton raised a claim that due process requires
bifurcation of the guilt phase and punishment phase. The California sentencing jury in McGautha
had the benefit of such a bifurcated proceeding. Id. at 186-91. The argument for bifurcation is best
explained by Justice Harlan:
[Crampton] enjoyed a constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Yet, under the Ohio single-trial procedure, he could remain silent on the issue
of guilt only at the cost of surrendering any chance to plead his case on the issue of
punishment. He contends that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,... he had a right to be heard on the issue of punishment and a right not
to have his sentence fixed without the benefit of all the relevant evidence. Therefore,
he argues, the Ohio procedure ... creates an intolerable tension between constitutional
rights. Since this tension can be largely avoided by a bifurcated trial, petitioner
contends that there is no legitimate state interest in putting him to the election, and
that the single-verdict trial should be held invalid in capital cases.
Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 210.
84. Id. at 217, 220.
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require a defendant on trial for his life and desirous of testifying on the issue of
punishment to make nice calculations of the effect of his testimony on the jury's
determination of guilt."85 He also recognized that the unitary system "may
mean that the death verdict will be returned by a jury which never heard the
sound of [the defendant's] voice."86 These unfortunate results, however, were
not considered to implicate the Constitution.87 In a final bizarre flourish, as if
to assuage the guilt of the majority, the Court claimed to find that the two trials
at issue "were entirely fair."ss
In the face of the majority's despairing retreat from regulation, Justice
Brennan wrote for three dissenting Justices 9 By recasting the argument
presented in the two cases before the Court, Justice Brennan quickly exposed the
basic ideological difference between himself and the majority: "The question the
petitioners present for our decision is whether the rule of law, basic to our
society and binding upon the States by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is fundamentally inconsistent with capital sentencing
procedures that are purposely constructed to allow the maximum possible
variation from one case to the next, and provide no mechanism to prevent that
consciously maximized variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary
choice." 90 Brennan perceived the majority's opinion as based on a belief that
the petitioners were seeking "predetermined standards so precise as to be capable
of purely mechanical application." 91 He saw petitioners' arguments, however,
as a request for improved procedures required by the fourteenth amendment. 92
The basic difference between these positions is, ultimately, the basic philosophical difference between Justice Brennan and so many Justices on the Court over
Brennan's tenure. The majority's conclusion that constitutional control over the

85. Id. at 214.
86. Id. at 220.
87. Id. at 217. "We conclude that the policies of the privilege against compelled selfincrimination are not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields to the pressure to testify on
the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on guilt." Id
88. Id. at 221. Only Justice Black, in a short concurrence, notes this strange additioni to the
Court's opinion: "IT]his Court's task is not to determine whether the petitioners' trials were 'fairly
conducted' .... The Constitution grants this Court no power to reverse convictions because of our
personal beliefs that state criminal procedures are 'unfair,' 'arbitrary,' 'capricious,' 'unreasonable,' or
'shocking to our conscience."' Id. at 225 (citations omitted). The majority, however, seemed to need
this personal self-assurance that they were, in fact, condemning fairly tried individuals guilty of
"gruesome murders." rd. at 221.
dissenting). Justice Douglas also filed a dissent in which Justice
Id. at 249 (Brennan, J.,
89.
dissenting). Justice Douglas' dissent
Brennan and Justice Marshall joined. Id. at 226 (Douglas, J.,
relates solely to the issues presented in Crampton regarding the unitary sentencing procedure.
90.
Id. at 248.
91.
Id. at 249. After re-casting the question presented, supra note 90 and accompanying text,
Justice Brennan criticized the majority for misunderstanding the question actually before the Court
"as if petitioners contend that due process requires capital sentencing to be carried out under
predetermined standards so precise as to be capable of purely mechanical application, entirely
eliminating any vestiges of flexibility or discretion in their use."
Id.
92.
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states' death penalty schemes should be abandoned stood in sharp contrast to the
arguments of Justice Brennan favoring regulation. These early tensions
represent the continuing constitutional debate regarding the administration of
the death penalty in the United States.
On one side was (and continues to be) those Justices who believe that the
administration of state death penalty laws, once enacted by an appropriate
representative legislature, should be unhampered by further federal intervention.
This theory, as articulated in McGautha, assumed the failure of regulation,
and rested its conclusion on the mere existence of the system it is supposed to
judge. Perhaps the Court recognized the huge task that it would have to
undertake, and how deep their involvement in state criminal administration
would become if they set such standards. Perhaps, ultimately, Supreme Court
mandated federal regulation of the death penalty would create a complicity with
state death penalty injustice that could not be tolerated. For whatever reason,
the McGautha majority stated a new philosophy of federal abstention. As
summarized by Justice Brennan, "[w]ith the issue so polarized, the Court is led
to conclude that the rule of law and the power of the States to kill are in
irreconcilable conflict. This conflict the Court resolves in favor of the States'
power to kill."94
On the other side were (and still are) those Justices who believed that federal
regulation of the death penalty in America is vital to the legitimacy of the
system. Justice Brennan, in supporting the application of standards under the
fourteenth amendment in McGautha, became a leader and articulate advocate
of this judicial philosophy. Expressing his belief that the McGautha majority
"errs at all points from its premises to its conclusions, "95 Justice Brennan
described his basic disagreement with the abstentionist view: "even if I shared the
Court's view that the rule of law and the power of the States to kill are in
irreconcilable conflict, I would have no hesitation in concluding that the rule of
law must prevail."96
This prevailing rule of law was, for Justice Brennan, the very purpose of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and therefore, the very
definition of federal supervisory power.97 For states to allow juries to determine who lives and who dies without standards, the very rule of law, as expressed
by the due process clause, is subjugated.9 Justice Brennan presumed the need

93.
94.

Id.
Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 249-50.

97.
Id. at 250. Justice Brennan recognized that the due process clause did not limit a state in
deciding what power to exert or not exert regarding specific issues, rather its function was to "require

that, if state power is to be exerted, these choices must be made by a responsible organ of state
government."

98.

Id. "If there is no effective supervision of this process to insure consistency of decision,

it can amount to nothing more than government by whim. But ours has been 'termed a government

of laws, and not of men'." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). Government by whim is
the very antithesis of due process. Id.
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for a rule of law as expressed in the due process clause and found the Constitution required standards and demanded federal review:
First, due process of law requires the States to protect individuals
against the arbitrary exercise of state power by assuring that the
fundamental policy choices underlying any exercise of state power are
explicitly articulated by some responsible organ of state government.
Second, due process of law is denied by state procedural mechanisms
that allow for the exercise of arbitrary power without providing any
means whereby arbitrary action may be reviewed or corrected. Third,
where federally protected rights are involved due process of law is
denied by state procedures which render inefficacious the federal
judicial machinery that has been established for the vindication of
those rights.99
Due process therefore required responsible action and responsive, reviewable
standards. Only through these basic procedural safeguards could the administration of the death penalty, or any system, be legitimate in a land ruled by laws.
This position urged by Justice Brennan did not end with the parallel
conclusion of the majority-that States could never adequately regulate-and
therefore regulation was unnecessary. Instead, he contemplated future support
for appropriate state attempts to properly administer the death penalty in a
constitutional fashion. 1' ° For the creation of these new, improved procedures,
Justice Brennan displayed great optimism that the states were sufficiently
creative and flexible to meet such a constitutional challenge. 101 Justice
Brennan's dissent was, in fact, a guide for the creation of what he would have
considered a constitutional death penalty scheme.1e2 The abstentionists

99.

Id. at 270 (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 249. Justice Brennan abandoned his faith in state legislatures' ability to devise
"imaginative procedures" to meet the demands of due process only one term later in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See infra note 148 and accompanying
text.
101. Id.

102. Id. at 250-51:
Such procedures may take avariety of forms. The decisionmaker may be provided with
a set of guidelines to apply in rendering judgment. His decision may be required to
rest upon the presence or absence of specific factors. If the legislature concludes that

the range of variation to be dealt with precludes adequate treatment under inflexible,

predetermined standards it may adopt more imaginative procedures. The specificity of
standards may be relaxed, directing the decisionmaker's attention to the basic policy
determinations underlying the statute without binding his action with regard to matters
of important but unforseen detail. He may be instructed to consider a list of
factors-either illustrative or exhaustive-intended to illuminate the question presented
without setting afixed balance. The process may draw upon the genius of the common
law, and direct itself towards the refinement of understanding through case-by-case
development. In such cases decision may be left almost entirely in the hands of the
body to which it isdelegated, with ultimate legislative supervision on questions of basic
policy afforded by requiring the decisionmakers to explain their actions, and
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required nothing of the states because they viewed perfection as unattainable.
Therefore, any constitutional requirement that states standardize or make
rational an inherently irrational system would be nothing more than an absurd
abuse of federal power. If the irrationality was inevitable in the system, then
review was also meaningless. Those favoring standards expected states to work
harder, and to create a better system. Justice Brennan's McGautha dissent was
ful of respect for that endeavor and could not countenance the majority's failure
to even require the states to attempt to create constitutionally acceptable
standards. 1a The view espoused by Justice Brennan was not a call for perfection, but rather a plea for something to review. If the states were able to create
criteria and sentencing juries were required to indicate how they applied those
criteria, then state and federal courts could review, and presumably, standardize
the process. The system would then be constitutional, and would comport to
Justice Brennan's three requirements of due process. 01 4
After fully discussing the doctrinal differences between the abstentionist
position and his own, Justice Brennan turned his attention to the state statutes
0
then pending before the Court.0'
After joining Justice Douglas' dissent on the
°*
bifurcation issue,' Justice Brennan easily found the Ohio statute at issue in
Crampton incompatible with the requirements of due process.'07 This was in
part because of the unitary nature of the guilt and sentencing proceeding in
Ohio. Justice Brennan found the statute provided no protection against "merely
arbitrary or willful decisionmaking,"'08 and therefore afforded no opportunity
for "the redress of any violations of federally guaranteed rights through the
institution of federal judicial review."1' 9 Turning to McGautha, Justice Brennan

evenhanded treatment enhanced by requiring disputed factual issues to be resolved and
providing for some form of subsequent review. Creative legislatures may yet devise
other procedures.
Although his language is at best vague, and at worse impenetrable, in this suggestion Justice
Brennan included all aspects ultimately required by the constitution. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The aspects

identified are (1) guidelines for the decisionmaker, which include (2) factors for consideration.
Although these factors might be specific or general, exhaustive or suggestive, they must be (3) flexible
and the decisionmaker must (4) make specific findings which are (5) reviewable. Ultimately, Justice
Brennan considered the duty to adequately review rested with both state and federal courts.
103. Id. at 285-86:
The point is that even if a State's notion of wise capital sentencing policy is such that
the policy cannot be implemented through a formula capable of mechanical applica-

tion-something which, incidentally, cannot be known unless and until the State makes
explicit precisely what that policy is-there is no reason that it should not give some
guidance to those called upon to render decision.
104.
105.

Id. at 270. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
Id. at 287.

106.

Id. at 226 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

107.
108.
109.

Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
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considered the differences between the sentencing procedures in Ohio and
reviewCalifornia. 10 Ultimately, he concluded that the absence of rationally
1
able standards rendered the California statute unconstitutional.' '
Justice Brennan's dissent in McGautha demonstrated: (1) his belief in the
constitutional requirement that statutes be rationally reviewable; and (2) his
explicit choice of the rule of law over federal abstention. Also, his dissent in
McGautha first embraced the concept that due process required a higher
standard of reliability when a state seeks the death of one of its citizens because
"life itself is an interest of such transcendent importance that a decision to take
a life may require procedural regularity far beyond a decision simply to set a
sentence at one or another term of years.""' This final conclusion of Justice
Brennan's dissent was primarily a product of personal morality rather than a
clear constitutional requirement. It was, however, an early indication of the
bridge over which he would travel during the next term.
C. Repudiation of Death:Furman v. Georgia
For Justice Brennan, the next stop along the road of death penalty adjudication was in many ways a full stop. McGautha was one of the last majority
opinions written by Justice Harlan.U Harlan's departure from the bench,
along with the vacancy created by the death of Hugo Black, were filled mfd-term
110. Id. at 297-304. Justice Brennan noted that in California the decision of punishment was
made in a separate proceeding from the guilt determination, the trial judge was allowed to override
a jury sentence of death, and the defendant was free to present a broad range of evidence in
mitigation of punishment. Id at 297-99.
111. Id. at 308. "In short, the procedure before us in this case simultaneously invites sentencers
to flout the Constitution of the United States and promises them that, should they do so, their action
is immune from federal judicial review." Id
112. Id. at 311. On this issue, Justice Brennan re-asserted his theory of the legitimizing value
of rational standards and judicial review in the specific context of state sanctioned killing:
[E]ven if I thought these procedures adequate to try a welfare claim-which they are not
...I would have little hesitation in finding them inadequate where life itself is at stake.
For we have long recognized that the degree of procedural regularity required by the
Due Process Clause increases with the importance of the interests at stake.... Yet the
Court's opinion turns the law on its head to conclude, apparently, that because a
decision to take someone's life is of such tremendous import, those who make such
decisions need not be "inhibit[ed]" by the safeguards otherwise required by due process
of law. My belief is to the contrary, and I would hold that no State which determines
to take a human life is thereby exempted from the constitutional command that it do
so only by "due process of law."

Id. at 309 (emphasis and brackets in original) (citations omitted). This position was later adopted by

a majority of the Court in the illuminating realization that death is different from any other form of
punishment and that the difference is constitutionally significant. Se4 eg, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976). This realization, first made explicit by Justice Brennan, became the constitutional
requirement of "heightened reliability' in death penalty cases. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S.
578 (1988); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980);
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
113. The McGautha opinion was delivered May 3, 1971. Justice John M. Harlan retired from
the Court on September 23, 1971, before the beginning of the 1971 October term, and died
December 29, 1971, before the term was half completed.
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by Justices Rehnquist and Powell.114 By that time, the Court had granted
certiorari in Furman v. Georgia"' and two companion cases116 to answer the
question: "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these
cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments?"" 7 This was the only systemic constitutional
challenge to the death penalty remaining after McGautha."' The adverse
resolution of the due process challenge left the Court to consider the petitions
for writ of certiorari that were held pending the outcome in McGautha."9
Justice Brennan, "convinced that [McGautha] was not just a lost skirmish, but
rather the end of any hope that the Court would hold capital punishment to be
unconstitutional,""m suggested at conference that certiorari be denied in all the
held cases. 21 Justice Black, who had, in McGautha, already made plain his
view that the eighth amendment did not restrict or prohibit the death penalty,
was in favor of granting certiorari to decide the issue once and for all."2 A
majority of the conference agreed with Justice Black and
23 certiorari was granted
to answer the remaining eighth amendment question.
After certiorari was granted, Justice Brennan left for the summer recess
believing he would be alone in dissent on the proposition that the eighth
amendment prohibited the death penalty. 2 4 However, more favorable signs
existed upon his return in October 1972, including some indication that the issue
was not finally settled. 125 Arguments in Furman were heard on January 17,

114.

Both Justices Rehnquist and Powell took their oath of office on January 7, 1972.

115.

403 U.S. 952 (1971).

116.

Jackson v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Branch v. Texas, 403 U.S. 952 (1971).

117.

Funnan, 408 U.S. at 239 (quoting 403 U.S. 952 (1971)) (brackets in 403 U.S. 952).

118.

402 U.S. at 310 n.74 (Brennan, I.dissenting) (eighth amendment restriction of states'

power to administer the death penalty is "a question not involved in these cases."). Justice Black
addressed the issue in his short concurrence stating: 'The Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and
unusual punishments.' In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because
that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our
ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted." Id. at 226 (Black, J., concurring).
119. Brennan, supra note 16, at 321.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 322. Certainly, Justice Black anticipated a quick and easy victory on the issue after
the less intrusive application of the due process clause to require bifurcated sentencing proceedings
was defeated. Even Justices Douglas and Marshall, who concurred with Justice Brennan in
McGautha, indicated at the conference that they would not hold capital punishment unconstitutional
under the eighth amendment.
123. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
124. Brennan, supra note 16, at 522.
125. Id.
Justice White remarked to me that he was not sure how he would come out, and
Justice Douglas was heard to say that he had not yet made up his mind.
i 'morning that the death cases were to be argued, Justice Marshall handed to me
a typed draft of an opinion concluding that the death penalty was unconstitutional...
. Justice Marshall told me that he was also delivering a copy of the opinion to Justice
Stewart. This was most encouraging; if Justice Stewart should agree that the death
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1972,1M only ten days after Justices Rehnquist and Powell officially took the
bench.127 On June 29, 1972, at the end of the 1971 October Term, the Court
handed down Furman v. Georgia.u
With Furman, Justice Brennan's hopes of the previous October became a
reality. Five Justices voted to invalidate all existing death penalty statutes under
the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the eighth amendmentY9 Justice
Brennan joined the majority, but held that the death penalty was in all
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment.m Justice Brennan reached the
conclusion that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional using a mbture of
precedent, legal reasoning, moral imperatives, and, overall-hope-that the power
of the Court could improve a society that appeared ambivalent about death as

a punishment.
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman began by defining the issue as
whether the death penalty was, "by virtue of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, beyond the power of the state to inflict." 131 Brennan's construction of the issue was more essential than the actual question presented to the

penalty was constitutionally invalid, a majority might be mustered for that view.
126. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
127. See supra note 114.
128. 408 U.S. at 238.
129. Id. at 239-40. McGautha, as Justice Brennan noted, seemed by its very tone to preclude
a finding that the death penaltyperse violated the eighth amendment. For, after the Court held the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require regulation of the states' death
penalty schemes, how could the Court leap to the conclusion that the scheme itself was constitutionally unsound. As explained by Professor Weisberg:
[T]he Justices could take advantage of the wonderful fiction that the Due Process
Clauses and the Eighth Amendment might have very different things to say abcut
standardless sentencing. While the Due Process Clause did not directly condemn the
"process" of the standardless schemes, the Eighth Amendment might still condemn the
"products" of that process-the actual pattern of sentences it yielded. The Court was
thus able to invoke the Eighth Amendment to nullify all death penalty schemes in the
United States then in operation.
Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 S.Cr. REv. 305, 315 (footnotes omitted).
The decision itself was structurally unique. The opinion of the Court was delivered in a shortper
cudam order granting relief in the cases: "he Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments." Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. This declaration of the result reached was
concurring); Id. at 257 (Brennan,
then followed by five concurring opinions. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); Id. at 314
J.,concurring); Id. at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). None of the concurring Justices joined any of the other Justice's opinions.
(Marshall, J.,
The concurring opinions were then followed by the separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 375
dissenting); Id.
(Burger, CJ., dissenting); Id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 414 (Powell, J.,
at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As if in parody of the fractured majority, each Justice in dissent
joined each of the other dissenting Justice's opinion.
With all Justices issuing opinions seriatim, Furman was the longest Supreme Court decision,
spanning 232 pages in the United States Reporter. Id at 238-470. The opinion's practical effect was
to invalidate "[t]he capital punishment laws of no less than 39 States and the District of Columbia."
Id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). Only Justice Marshall stated a similar belief that the
concurring).
death penalty was impermissible under the eighth amendment. Id. at 315 (Marshall, J.,
131. Id. at 257 (footnote omitted).
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Court.1 A decision in favor of the petitioners on this issue would have put
an end to the entire system of capital punishment.
After acknowledging the implications of his construction, Justice Brennan
embarked on a long historical analysis of the eighth amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause.1 3 The discussion of the clause's history led him
to conclude that one "simply cannot know exactly or with certitude what punishments the Framers thought were cruel and unusual."'m Whatever its scope,
"
Justice Brennan understood the clause to be a "restraint upon legislatures. 1s
Because of the clause's intrinsic vagueness, and because the clause was a guard
against abuse of power, the federal judiciary seemed the appropriate master of
its meaning.'1
Relying on this basis, and the scant precedent supplied by Weems v. United
States 7 and TRop v. Dulles,m Justice Brennan came to a definition of the
clause that would form his ultimate decision:
At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The
State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for
their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is "cruel and
unusual," therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.1 9
This was more of a moral statement than an appellate standard easily applied to
particular situations. However, Justice Brennan sought to give substance to this
ideal standard. The principles providing the basis for his definition were that a
severe punishment "must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of

132. Id. at 239. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 258-69. See also Brennan, supra note 16, at 323.
134. Brennan, supra note 16, at 323.
135. Funnan, 408 U.S. at 267 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910)).
According to Justice Brennan, Weems was the first Supreme Court decision to reject the "historical"
interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. That case held that what was accepted
punishment at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights was necessarily constitutional and
therefore continued to be so. In favor of a more flexible standard under the eighth amendment, the
Weems Court, in prophetic language, noted that the future constitutional system would involve abuses
never imagined in any monarchy. "The abuse of power might, indeed, be apprehended, but not that
it would be manifested in provisions or practices which would shock the sensibilities of men." Id. at
266 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 375).
136. Id at 267. "Accordingly, the responsibility lies with the courts to make certain that the
prohibition of the Clause is enforced." Id (footnote omitted). See id. at 269 ('Judicial enforcement
of the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have the power
to proscribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason the Clause appears in the Bill of
Rights.'.
137. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that the Philippine punishment of cadena temporal, which
included, inter alia, imprisonment for twelve years and one day in chains at hard labor, loss of many
rights of citizenship, and lifetime state supervision, violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment).
138. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (punishment of expatriation violated the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause).
139. Furman, 408 U.S. at 270.
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human beings;" 14 must not be arbitrarily inflicted by the state;14t "must not
be unacceptable to contemporary society;"14 and "must not be excessive."143
Applying these principles to the death penalty, Justice Brennan concluded that
the death penalty was a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth
amendment. 14
In sum, the punishment of death is inconsistent with all four
principles: Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment;
there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection
by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to
believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less
severe punishment of imprisonment. The function of these principles
is to enable a court to determine whether a punishment comports
with human dignity. Death, quite simply, does not. 45

140. Id at 271. Justice Brennan termed this the "primary principle" of the eighth amendment.
141. Id. at 274. Justice Brennan defined the arbitrariness of the death penalty by the
"infrequency with which we resort to it." Id. at 291. In defining the infrequency, he noted the number
of executions each year from 1930 to the date of the Funnanopinion: "From 1930 to 1939: 155, 153,
140, 160, 168, 199, 195, 147, 190, 160. From 1940 to 1949: 124, 123, 147, 131, 120, 117, 131, 153,
119, 119. From 1950 to 1959: 82, 105, 83, 62, 81, 76, 65, 65, 49, 49. From 1960 to 1967: 56, 42, 47,
21, 15, 7, 1, 2.... The last execution in the United States [before Funnan]took place on June 2,
1967." Id. at 291 n.40 (citing Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics No. 46, Capital
Punishment 1930-1970, at 8 (Aug. 1971)).
The following number of executions occurred in the United States after the penalty was reinstated
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976): From 1976 to 1979: 0, 1, 0, 2. From 1980 to 1989: 0, 1,
2, 5, 21, 18, 18, 25, 11, 16. 1990: 23. In January 1991, there were 2,412 known death row inmates.
Therefore, the country is currently executing less than 1% of its condemned inmates per year.
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. (Jan. 21, 1991).
142. Furman, 408 U.S. at 277.
143. Id. at 279. To further flesh out this principle of "excessiveness," Justice Brennan wrote:
A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: The infliction of a
severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing
more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe
punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted..
. the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Brennan considered the rare application of the death penalty defeated
even the base argument that capital punishment was necessary for community retribution: "If capital
crimes require the punishment of death in order to provide moral reinforcement for the basic values
of the community, those values can only be undermined when the death is so rarely inflicted upon the
criminals who commit the crimes." Id. at 303.
144. Id. at 286 C'It is a denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to
an unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as acceptable, and that
cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic
punishment. Under these principles and this test, death is today a "cruel and unusual" punishment.").
145. Id. at 305 C'When examined by the principles applicable under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity. The punishment
of death is therefore "cruel and unusual," and the States may no longer inflict it as punishment for
crimes. Rather than kill an arbitrary handful of criminals each year, the States will confine them in
prison.").
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Justice Brennan questioned the "products"14 of the death penalty only as they
related to the ultimate mandate embodied in the eighth amendment."'
The basis of Justice Brennan's opinion, as well as the absolute nature of his
result, was a momentous departure from his previous opinion in McGautha.
However, his position in Furman was also a fulfillment of his promise in
McGautha. Faced with the increasingly impossible task of regulating the death
penalty in the United States, Justice Brennan concluded "that the rule of law
must prevail." 1 However, the rule of law no longer meant simply rational
review, it now required abolition. It was as though the cynicism of Justice
Harlan's abdication of constitutional control was embraced by Justice Brennan
when the eighth amendment opportunity arose. Having lost the battle over the
application of the due process clause, he moved the playing field to the question
of eighth amendment prohibition. His lengthy dissent in McGautha expressed
positive faith in state legislatures' ability to cure constitutional infirmities.
Justice Brennan's statement of confidence was replaced in Furman with an
unyielding proclamation that there was nothing left for states to do but stop the
killing.
A close analysis of the two opinions reveals more consistency than conflict in
Justice Brennan's reasoning. In McGautha, the Court was asked to determine
the constitutionality of existing schemes under the due process clause. Justice
Brennan identified constitutional infirmity in the standardless way the states
imposed death. He was therefore appropriately supportive of the states'
legislative power to create appropriate guiding procedures. In Furman, when
faced with the question of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition, he applied his belief that the death penalty was ultimately degrading
to humanity to support his legal conclusion that the penalty must be abolished.
Perhaps Justice Brennan's conclusion that the death penalty must be banned was
illuminated by Justice Harlan's opinion that the federal courts could not hope
to regulate the punishment. Brennan's conclusion, however, was much more
than simple acceptance of Harlan's hopeless opinion. Where the result of
Harlan's opinion was standardlesss execution, the result of Brennan's opinion
was an end to state-sanctioned killing.
Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall, the other Justices in the Furman
majority applied a unique formulation of the eighth amendment's proscription

146. The unconstitutional "products" of the death penalty included arbitrary and capricious
sentencing, racial and socioeconomic discrimination, and infrequent and freakishly random executions.
Unlike Justices Douglas, White, and Stewart, who focused their eighth amendment analysis on these
resulting products, Justice Brennan (and Justice Marshall) focused on the ultimate textual question

of what was "prohibited:' See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
147. See also id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). Although Justice Marshall reached the same
conclusion as Justice Brennan, he based his finding largely on his faith in the beneficence of present

society. "I cannot agree that the American people have been so hardened, so embittered that they
want to take the life of one who performs even the basest criminal act knowing that the execution is
nothing more than bloodlust. This has not been my experience with my fellow citizens. Rather I have
found that they earnestly desire their systems of punishments to make sense in order that it can be
a morally justifiable system." Id. at 370 n.163.
148. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 250 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and found the "products" of the states' death penalty schemes unconstitutional.
Justice Douglas found the eighth amendment was violated largely because "the
death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices
against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if
he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by
social position may be in a more protected position."'4 Justice White indicated immediately that he did not consider the death penaltyper se unconstitutional.'5 Accepting deterrence and retribution as legitimate state interests in the
administration of the death penalty, Justice White found that the eighth
amendment was violated in large part due to its infrequent imposition.151
Justice Stewart, the author of Witherspoon and a member of the majority in
McGautha, found that the eighth amendment was violated by the death penalty
systems before
the Court because they were applied in a random and infrequent
52

manner.'

149.
150.
151.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 240, 255 (Douglas, 3., concurring).
Id. at 310, 310-311 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 313.

I can do no more than state a conclusion based on ten years of almost daily exposure
to the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal
cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion, as
I have said, is that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most
atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
AcL
What Justice White appeared to require under the eighth amendment was less discretion, and more
executions. His dissent called for, if not by name, mandatory death sentences. Justice White's
position in Furman looked to be incompatible with his silent agreement with the majority in
McGautha. In seeking faster, less arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, he would necessarily
require procedures for insuring accurate determinations followed by swift review procedures.
However, the very absence of speedy procedures may be the key to his position in both cases. In
McGautha,the procedures sought by the petitioners would have ensured more elaborate proceedings
and broader, more time consuming, federal review. This ultimately would have been antithetical to
swift imposition of the death penalty for those convicted and sentenced.
It is interesting to note that the dissenters-Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist-were all
appointed by President Nixon. None of them experienced the Warren Court debates before
McGautha,nor, presumably, the ten years of daily exposure to the death penalty system in the United
States that swayed Justice White. This fact may have greatly influenced the Funnan majority in this
last broad attempt to convince the states that the death penalty should be abandoned.
152. Id. at 306, 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 'These death sentences are cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. In his concurrence, Justice
Stewart appeared close to siding with Justices Brennan and Marshall:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
For these and other reasons, at least two of my Brothers have concluded that the
infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Their case is a strong one.
Id
Ultimately, however, Justice Stewart chose to focus, with Justices White and Douglas, on the
products of the systems in question which he considered to be "so wantonly and so freakishly
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None of the other three concurring Furman Justices stated what the eighth
amendment actually required. The violation found by each Justice seemed to be
procedural rather than the "pure" eighth amendment prohibition found by
Justices Brennan and Marshall. Their focus on the improper products of the
states' systems must be seen as a requirement for standards and rationally
reviewable procedures. This "complaint" of the three other concurring Justices
seems at odds with the holding only one year earlier in McGautha. This fact was
not ignored by the dissenters. 3
Furman itself can be best understood by its result rather than its reasoning.
It was not a case that clearly defined what was constitutional, but rather it listed
many factors that, singly or collectively, rendered entire systems of state capital
punishment intolerable. Justice Brennan's and Justice Marshall's contribution
to the future of constitutional dialogue regarding the death penalty can be
viewed in a similar fashion: the conclusion that death was, in all cases, a
prohibited punishment defined one limit of the debate. Staking out an absolute
position brought the issue closer to their view and away from the apparently
intractable position of McGautha. Where the other three dissenters held out
some hope that there could be a constitutional death penalty, Justices Brennan
and Marshall discouraged any attempts to move in that direction. Their
arguments did not persuade a majority of the Court, but they created doubt
about the final constitutionality of any future death penalty systems.154
D. The Age of Dissent: Gregg v. Georgia
State response to Furmanwas swift. Given the apparent disarray of a narrow
and unclear majority, and the possible support of several of the Justices in the
Furman majority if the systems for imposing the death penalty were improved,
a large number of the states moved decisively to get the death penalty back

imposed." Id. at 310.
153.
Id. at 375, 399 (Burger, Ci., dissenting). C("he approach of these concurring opinions
has no antecedent in the Eighth Amendment cases. It is essentially and exclusively a procedural due
process argument. This ground of decision is plainly foreclosed as well as misplaced. Only one year
ago, in McGautha v. California, the Court upheld the prevailing system of sentencing in capital
cases.") See also id. at 405, 408 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414, 426-28 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist's dissent is a five page discussion of the evils of judicial activism. Id. at 465
(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Although he joined in each of the other dissents, he neither discussed the
issue before him, nor its treatment by the Court.
154. Professor Weisberg, in his article DeregulatingDeath, claims that the opinions of Justice
Brennan and Justice Marshall "are no longer important parts of the history of the Court's doctrine,
though they do provide some of the normative language the Court uses later in selectively approving
death penalty laws." See Weisberg, supra note 129, at 315. In that their absolute prohibition stance
never commands a majority of the Court, this statement is correct. However, the very nature of the
death penalty debate was affected forever by two Justices finding a constitutional basis for abolition.
See generally G. HAwKINS & F. ZIMRING, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 157
(1987) (contrary to current trends, the United States Supreme Court will lead this nation to abolish
the death penalty in the not too distant future).
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before the Courtm s5 The immediate problem for the states was how to craft
a constitutional scheme.
Although states were forced to draw conclusions from the many opinions when
crafting new death penalty statutes, the Furman concurring opinions offered
advice and expressed concerns more than they offered constitutional guidance.
The eighth amendment objections of Justice White, concerning the arbitrary
imposition of the penalty, were best met with a mandatory scheme. The
opinions of Justices Douglas and Stewart required something more. Their
opinions, focusing on the random and perhaps bigoted sentencing patterns in
capital cases, required jury guidance, rational reviewability, and an end to the
influence of arbitrary sentencing factors such as race, poverty, or lack of
education. Although these concerns might be cured by a mandatory sentencing
structure, how could the states respond to the objections of Justices Brennan and
Marshall? If the Justices continued to hold the death penalty unconstitutional
in all cases, then no response would be sufficient. However, if they added their
powerful voices on the Court to radically change the requirements of review and
standardization, an entirely new type of statute would need to be created.
Finally, what were the states to do about
the issue of respect for humanity that
56
concerned so many of the Justices?

155. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976). In Justice Stewart's opinion,
joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, the Court surveyed the response to Furman and found the
following thirty-five states had enacted death penalty statutes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,

Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,

Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. The Court also noted that the federal government
had created a death penalty statute for "aircraft piracy." Id. at 180 n. 24.
Currently, thirty-eight states impose capital punishment: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New

Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, the United States Government, and the United States Military.
Of these jurisdictions, only three have active statutory provisions but no sentences impesed: New
Hampshire, South Dakota, and the United States Government.
There are only fifteen jurisdictions with no capital punishment schemes: Alaska, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North

Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
supra note 141.
156. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty's implicit rejection
of a defendant's humanity wasper se a violation of the eighth amendment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257,
305 (Brennan, J, concurring) (the death penalty does not "comport with human dignity"); Id at 314,
371 (Marshall, 3.,
concurring) (striking down capital punishment celebrates "regard for civilization and
humanity"). Several other Justices joined in expressing their views of the problems of considering the
special circumstances of individuals. Id. at 240, 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discretionary
sentencing schemes unconstitutional because they are "pregnant with discrimination'); A, at 306
(Stewart, J, concurring) (death penalty is unique"in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied
in our concept of humanity); id. at 375,402 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (mandatory sentencing schemes
offensive because they ignore the fact that "individual culpability is not always measured by the
category of the crime committed). See also id. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no
one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death
penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol27/iss2/3

26

Pokorak: "Death Stands Condemned:" Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty
JUSTICE BRENNAN AND THE DEATH PENALTY

The states responded to these questions in different ways. Some states read
the opinions of Justices White and Douglas as requiring mandatory death
sentences for a limited class of crimes. 7 These states imposed the death
penalty on anyone and everyone convicted of these crimes. This approach was
intended to meet the complaint of standardless discretion at the punishment
phase of a capital case because it allowed no room for discriminatory variables
in sentencing.
Other states created varied systems of "guided discretion" in jury sentencing.158 Guided discretion statutes included several similar characteristics. Each
provided for (1) a separate sentencing procedure; (2) some statutory sentencing
considerations, usually in the form of aggravating and mitigating factors. Other
states combined elements from the mandatory and guided discretion statutes;
they identified specific classes of crimes which would be punished by death but
also gave the sentencing jury limited guidance during the bifurcated sentencing
phaseU 9 All of these statutes included a provision for direct review of every
case in which a defendant was sentenced to death. These statutes responded to
the issue confronted in Witherspoon, the dissent of Justice Brennan inMcGautha,
and the overt concern for the individual displayed by Justices Brennan and
Marshall in their abolitionist conclusion in Funnan.'60
The Supreme Court, in the October 1975 term,'6' decided five cases representing post-Furman statutes from five different states. 62 The Court granted
certiorari in these cases to determine whether the imposition of the death
penalty in each case was "'cruel and unusual' punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."63 The "lead" case among the five was
Gregg v. Georgia,'64 in which the constitutionality of a death sentence for

exercised by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment
serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's
training and life's experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions
I have been able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life."
157.
See eg., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating North Carolina's
mandatory sentencing scheme for murder); (Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(same for Louisiana mandatory statute); (Harry) Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (same,
for Louisiana mandatory statute regarding the aggravated murder of a police officer).
158. See, eg., Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (upholding Georgia's "guided discretion" death penalty
statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (same for Florida statute).
159. See, eg, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas' post-Furman statute that
narrowed the class of death eligible defendants in the guilt/innocence phase and supplied jurors with
three special issue questions to answer in the punishment phase).
160. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
161.

The Court had again changed personnel. Justice William 0. Douglas, who had been in the

majority in Furman, retired from the Court on November 12,1975. He was replaced by Justice John
Paul Stevens who took office on December 19, 1975.
162. Certiorari was granted in: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), cert.granted, 423 U.S.
1082 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1082 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), cert.granted 423 U.S. 1082 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976), cert. granted,423 U.S. 1082 (1976); and (Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976), cert. granted 423 U.S. 1082 (1976).
163. See, eg., Gregg v. Georgia, cert. granted,423 U.S. 1082 (1976).

164.

428 U.S. 153.
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murder under the newly enacted, post-Furman, Georgia scheme was challenged.t6s By a seven to two majority, the Supreme Court held the Georgia
bifurcated sentencing scheme was constitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.'6 The questions that remained with respect to the role that
Justices Brennan and Marshall would play in a new era of the death penalty in
America was forever decided. Both Justices wrote dissenting opinions in which
they maintained their earlier abolitionist conclusion that the death penalty, in
all circumstances, was unconstitutional. 167
The Court first addressed the issue that was not satisfactorily answered in
Furman:Whether "the punishment of death for the crime of murder is, under all
circumstances, 'cruel and unusual' in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the Constitution."16 Examining the same history that was

extensively discussed in Furman,169 the majority recognized the impact of a
decision in favor of total prohibition. "A decision that a given punishment is
impermissible under the eighth amendment cannot be reversed short of a
constitutional amendment. The ability of the people to express their preference
through the normal democratic processes, as well as through ballot referenda, is
shut off. Revisions cannot be made in the light of further experience." 170
Having articulated the enormity of such a decision, the majority in Gregg
concluded that "[c]onsiderations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability
of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus
concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to
conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of death

as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus not unconstitutionally severe."'7 ' After deciding that no per se constitutional prohibition

165. Id. at 162.
166. Id. at 207. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Stewart, who was joined by
Justices Powell and Stevens. Id. at 158. In joining this majority, Justice Stevens fit into the moderate
middle ground of constitutional overview of states' death penalty procedures. Justice White
concurred in the judgment and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 207.
Justice Blackmun filed a separate, cursory statement concurring in the judgment. Id. at 227. Both
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 227, 231.
167. Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 168.
169. Id. at 169-76.
170. Id. at 176. It is difficult to imagine to what "further experience!' Justice Stewart was
referring. The majority admitted the eighth amendment was not slave to the penalties historically
available at the time of its ratification. Noting that the "Eighth Amendment has not been regarded
as a static concept," the Court held that the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause took "'its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 173
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). Therefore, if the Court
required the abolition of death as punishment under the eighth amendment, the only "further
experience" possible for a reversal of that decision would be a slow sink of civilization-a de-evolution
into indecency.
171. Id. at 186-87. The majority's reasons for reaching this result included: "capital punishment
itself has not been rejected by the elected representatives of the people" (id. at 180-81); capital
punishment may serve the states' interest in retribution and deterrence (id. at 183); "capital
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases [as] an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
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existed, the Court analyzed, and ultimately upheld, the statute under which
Gregg was convicted and sentenced to death. 172
The Georgia statute at issue in Gregg was representative of many states'
response to the inconsistent messages of Furman and previous death penalty
cases. Georgia had enacted a statute that allowed the death penalty to be
imposed on individuals convicted for one of "six categories of crime: murder,
kidnapping for ransom or where the victim is harmed, armed robbery, rape,
treason, and aircraft hijacking."1' 3 However, the inquiry did not end with
conviction. 174

Once a defendant was found guilty of a capital crime, Georgia required a
bifurcated sentencing proceeding to determine the appropriate punishment. 75
Georgia controlled and guided the discretion of the jury at sentencing by
requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of ten
statutory aggravating factors existed. 176 Once the state had met this burden,
response may be the penalty of death" (id. at 184 (footnote omitted)); and that issues surrounding
capital punishment are best left with legislatures "which can evaluate the results of statistical studies
in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts." Id. at 186.
172. Id. at 187. The Court formulated the issue as "whether Georgia may impose the death
penalty on the petitioner in this case." Md The petitioner, Troy Gregg, was charged with two counts
each of capital armed robbery and capital murder. Id. at 160. After the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four capital counts. The trial court then held a bifurcated
sentencing proceeding, where no further evidence was presented. Id. The judge charged the jury
pursuant to the post-Furmanstatute. They were told they could recommend either a death sentence
or a sentence of life in prison on each count. Id. The jury returned death sentences on each count.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the death penalty for the capital murder
counts. Id.at 161. The sentences of death for the two armed robbery counts, however, "werevacated
on the grounds that the death penalty had rarely been imposed in Georgia for that offense... .' Id.
at 162.
173. Id. at 162-63 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, 26-1311, 26-1902,26-2001,26-2201,263301 (1972)) (footnotes omitted). The Court noted that these capital felonies were "defined as they
were when Furman was decided. The 1973 [post-Fumna] amendments to the Georgia statute,
however, natrowed the class of crimes potentially punishable by death by eliminating capital pejury."
Id. at 163 n.6.
174. Id. at 163. C(he capital defendant's guilt innocence is determined in the traditional
manner, either by a trial judge or a jury, in the first stage of a bifurcated trial.").
175. Id. at 195.

Iad

[Tihe concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an
arbitrary and capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general
proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated
proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to
the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of information.

176. Id. at 164. The statutory aggravating circumstances listed in GA. CODE ANN. § 272534.1(b) (1972 & Supp. 1975) were as follows:
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the
judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider,
any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law
and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported
by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
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the jury could consider any and all mitigating and aggravating factors allowed by
law in their determination of whether death was the appropriate punishment.'"

The Georgia "guided discretion" punishment phase statute also required the
Supreme Court of Georgia to review all death penalty convictions and sentences
for error.'7 Once the penalty of death was determined to be constitutional,
the Gregg Court demanded only constitutional procedures. The Georgia statute
satisfied the Constitution not because it ended discriminatory and arbitrary
sentencing, but rather because it created procedures designed to address those

person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder
was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while
the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated
battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of ajudicial officer, formerjudicial officer, district attorney or solicitor
or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official
duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder
as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offence of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165-66 n.9 (quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. at 164. The defendant was afforded "substantial latitude as to the types of evidence that
he may introduce." Id
178. Id. at 166. The Georgia Supreme Court was statutorily required to directly review, on an
expedited basis "the appropriateness of imposing the sentence of death in the particular case." The
three issues that the statute required the court review were:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether, in -cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports
the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in
section 27.2534.1(b), and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (1972 & Supp. 1975)) (quotation marks omitted).
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issues.179 Untrammeled discretion was eliminated and replaced with bifurcated
proceedings which was governed by standards. Of course, it was too early to tell
whether the new Georgia statute would, in practice, actually answer the
constitutional concerns raised in Furman. However, the statute did seek, facially,
to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing.
The eighth amendment was therefore held to require adequate procedures to
ensure non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory proceedings which could be
rationally reviewed by appellate courts. Justice Brennan asked for no more in
his dissent in McGautha.18 In fact, in their Furman opinion, the majority fully
embraced the reasoning and conclusions expressed by Justice Brennan in
McGautha, although they continued to have difficulty admitting as much.181
The de facto result of Furman plus Gregg was that McGautha was overruled.
Rather than admit that the eighth amendment was not an appropriate
constitutional basis for the regulation of procedures, the majority limited
McGautha to its factslu and joined the eighth amendment's proscription of
"cruel and unusual" punishments with the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause requirement. The result was to create constitutionally required
procedures in death penalty sentencing to ensure non-arbitrary results. The
179. Justice White, in his concurrence, discussed the argument that the death penalty was, by
its very nature, incapable of being freed from arbitrary imposition or discriminatory impact. Id. at
207, 226 (White, J., concurring). Returning to the resigned conclusion of Justice Harlan in
McGautha, see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text, Justice White even more cynically admits
that "[m]istakes will be made and discriminations will occur which will be difficult to explain." Id. at
226.
Considering the discriminations and mistakes that could result in someone's wrongful execution,
explanations of any sort seem inadequate. According to Justice White, such "mistakes" are a
necessary bi-product of states' criminal laws. Id. Justice White thereby turns upside-down
Blackstone's basic tenet: "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer."
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND, Book IV, at 27.
180. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. See Greg, 428 U.S. at 196-97 n.47:
In McGautha v. California... this Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require that a jury be provided with standards to guide
its decision whether to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment or death or that the
capital-sentencing proceeding be separated from the guilt-determination precess.
McGautha was not an Eighth Amendment decision, and to the extent it purported to
deal with Eighth Amendment concerns, it must be read in light of the opinions in
Furman v. Georgia. There the Court ruled that death sentences imposed under statutes
that left juries with untrammelled discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. While Furman did not overrule
McGautha, it is clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading on McGautha's
holding. In view of Furman, McGautha can be viewed rationally as a precedent only
for the proposition that standardless jury sentencing procedures were not employed in
the cases there before the Court so as to violate the Due Process Clause. We note that
McGautha's assumption that it is not possible to devise standards to guide and
regularize jury sentencing in capital cases has been undermined by subsequent
experience. In view of that experience and the considerations set forth in the text, we
adhere to Furman'sdetermination that where the ultimate punishment of death is at
issue a system of standardless jury discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
182. Id. at 197.
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creation of this procedural component of the eighth amendment was the product
of the Court's prior death penalty decisions and the basic constitutional premise
that "death is different."18
Justice Brennan rejected this constitutional compromise and re-asserted his
conclusion in Furman that the death penalty was, in all circumstances, cruel and
unusual punishment and therefore unconstitutional in any form. 184 Justice
Brennan's dissent in Gregg was brief.la5 A substantial portion of the dissent
simply re-iterated his concurrence from Furman.186 Justice Brennan neither
addressed the specific eighth amendment arguments of the Court, nor directed
any criticism towards the Georgia statute at issue. Because the focus of his
conclusion in Furman was that civilization and morality demanded an end to the
death penalty, it would have been dishonest to retreat from that holding in
Gregg. Once Justice Brennan drew his own line of abolition, there was
practically no way of constitutionally stepping over it.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Gregg, restating his position inFunan, also served
as his dissent to the Court's opinions upholding the "guided discretion" statutes
Justice Brennan filed
presented in Proffitt v. Florida1 8 and Jurek v. Texas.

183. Id. at 188.
184. Id. at 227, 230-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 227-31.
186. Id. at 227-29. "My opinion in Furman v. Georgia concluded that our civilization and the
law had progressed to [the point that] the punishment of death, for whatever crime and under all
circumstances, is 'cruel and unusual' in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. I shall not again canvass the reasons that led to that conclusion." Id. at 229.
187. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). In Profflu, the Court reviewed the post-Furman "guided discretion"
statute enacted by Florida. The statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (Supp. 1976-77), was "patterned
in large part on the Model Penal Code." Id. at 247-48. Capital offenses in Florida included
premeditated murder, murder in the course of specified felonies (arson, sexual battery, robbery,
burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or bombing), a death that resulted from the distribution of
heroin to a person under eighteen years of age. Id. at 247 n.4 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)
(Supp. 1976-77)). Florida also authorized the death penalty for sexual battery on a child under twelve
years of age. Id. at 248 n.4 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (Supp. 1976-77)). Florida's capital
crimes, therefore, were not as broadly defined as those in Georgia.
If a defendant was found guilty of a capital offense, a separate sentencing phase was held before
the jury to determine the sentence. Id. at 248. The only options in a capital sentencing proceeding
were death or life imprisonment. Id. at 247 n.4 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(b)). Any
evidence could be presented in the punishment phase that was relevant to the sentencing
determination. Id. at 248. Both attorneys for the prosecution and for the defense were allowed to
make argument at the punishment phase. Id.
The jurors were then "directed to consider '[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and ... [b]ased on these considerations,
whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death.'" Id. (quoting FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 921.141(2)(b-c) (Supp. 1976-77) (brackets and ellipses added in Proffit). The statutory
aggravating circumstances were:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
Cc) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy
or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
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(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
government function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, orcruel.
Id. at 248-49 n.6 (quoting FLA.STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1976-77)). The statutory mitigating
circumstances were:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. at 249 n.6 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (Supp. 1976-77)) (quotation marks omitted).
Once the jury considered all the evidence as it related to the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, they were instructed to cast their vote on which sentence should be applied. Id. at 248.
The vote was only advisory, as the actual sentence was determined by the trial judge. Id. The judge
could not upset a jury recommendation of life unless "'the facts suggesting a sentence of death [were]
so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."' Id.at 249 (quoting Tedder
v. State, 328 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1976)). Further, if the trial judge determined that death was the
appropriate punishment, either in support or in spite of the jury recommendation, he was required
to set out in writing the basis of that finding. Id. at 250. This written explanation had to include "'(a)
[t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances exist ... and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient
[statutory] mitigating circumstances... to outweigh the mitigating circumstances."' Id. (quoting FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (Supp. 1976-77)).
Finally, the post-Furman statute required direct appellate review of all cases which resulted in a
sentence of death. Id.
188. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Texas statute at issue in Jurek was certainly the most unique
death penalty scheme considered by the Supreme Court in 1976. It was a compromise approach
between the guided discretion statutes of Georgia and Florida and the mandatory sentencing statutes
of North Carolina and Louisiana. Texas' post-Furmanstatute first narrowed the class of murderers
that were eligible for a sentence of death. Id.at 268. The statute essentially created a "murder-plus"
category- for an intentional murder to be a capital crime, it had to have been committed in one of
five specific circumstances: "murder of a peace officer or fireman; murder committed in the course
of kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; murder committed for remuneration; murder
committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; and murder committed
by a prison inmate when the victim is a prison employee." Id. (citing TEx. PEN. CODE § 19.03 (1974).
If a defendant was found guilty of any of these murder-plus crimes, then he or she would be death
eligible and the court would hold a separate sentencing hearing before a jury. Id. at 269 (citing TEx
CODE CRIM. PRoc., art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975-76)). The jury, after hearing evidence both in aggravation
and mitigation of punishment, were required to return answers to three statutory special issue
questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society, and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
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short concurring opinions in the two other death penalty cases decided that day,
Woodson v. North Carolina18 and (Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana.19 Both

Id. at 269 (quoting TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC., art. 37.071(b) (Supp. 1975-76)). If the jury finds that
each of the questions has been proven "yes" beyond a reasonable doubt, then a sentence of death was
imposed; if any of the answers were "no," then a sentence of life in prison was imposed. Id. (citing
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 37.071(c), (e)). As with the other guided discretion statutes, direct
expedited review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was mandated. Id. (citing Tex CODE CRIM.
PROC., art. 37.071(f) (Supp. 1975-76)).
In upholding the statute, the Court noted that "Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating
circumstances..." like Georgia and Florida. Id. at 270. The Court considered the narrow class of
capital murders as serving roughly the same function as aggravating circumstances. Id. The Court
recognized in Jurd that "a sentencing system that allowed the jury to consider only aggravating
circumstances would almost certainly fall short of providing the individualized sentencing
determination" constitutionally required. Id. at 271. The Court therefore recognized that "the
constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated question,; allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors." Id. at 272. Ultimately, the Court felt the promise
that Texas would allow juries to consider mitigating evidence sufficient reason for granting its
imprimatur of constitutional validity. Id. at 272 n.7. Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court
revisited this very issue and found the Texas statute wanting. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
(Texas punishment scheme special issue questions do not allow the jury to fully consider or give effect
to mitigating evidence).
189. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In response to Furman, North Carolina enacted a mandatory capital
punishment scheme for first degree murder. Id. at 286. First degree murder was described as
follows:
Murder in the first and second degree defene4 punishment.-A murder which shall be
perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any
other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping,
burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be
punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second
degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years
nor more than life imprisonment in the State's prison.
Id. (quoting N.C. GEM. STAT. §§ 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975)) (emphasis added). North Carolina also
enacted a statute requiring a mandatory death sentence for a conviction of first degree rape. Id. at
287 n.6 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1975)).
The Court found three separate constitutional infirmities in mandatory sentencing schemes. First,
they did not comport with "contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the punishment of
death." Id. at 301. Second, mandatory sentencing schemes did not"fulfill Furnan'sbasic requirement
by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and
make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." Id. at 303. Finally,
mandatory sentencing schemes violated the eighth amendment because they did not allow the
sentencer an opportunity to consider "the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense." Id. at 304. Individualized sentencing after Furman thus
became "a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Id.
190. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The Louisiana statute enacted in response to Funnan,like its North
Carolina counterpart, required a mandatory sentence of death for those convicted of first degree
murder. Louisiana's statutory definition was:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated rape or armed robbery;, or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon,
a fireman or peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and
has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon
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cases involved mandatory sentencing schemes ultimately struck down by the
Court. Justice Brennan filed short statements concurring in the judgments.19'
These five cases signaled the re-birth of the death penalty in the United States
and again allowed states to sentence people to die. However, the Court's
rejection of some schemes and acceptance of others, combined with the specter
of Furman and total abolition, indicated that, as much as any state organized and
maintained system could be, the death penalty was federalized. It would be
controlled by federal constitutional law and federal precedent. The eighth and
fourteenth amendments would be the ultimate arbiter of disputes and each
system would be carefully supervised by the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court. States, ultimately, would not be alone in the decision of who
should die.
In many ways, Justice Brennan received everything he asked for in McGautha:
standardization, rational reviewability, and federal supervisory power over the
death penalty system in the United States. Of course, he did not achieve what
he sought in Furman. His opinions served, however, as a constant reminder to
the states that the death penalty was not their exclusive bailiwick, that only a few
votes in the Supreme Court kept death rows occupied and executioners
employed. Justice Brennan's position also represented the ultimate hope for
death penalty defense attorneys: his was the voice of the possible speaking to the
patient and perseverent.

II. THE AGE OF DISSENT
After Gregg, Justice Brennan did not veer from his position that the
punishment of death was, in all circumstances, unconstitutional. His opinions
in all death penalty cases before the Court reflected that stance. He concurred
at least in part in all reversals of a sentence of death, and, without exception,
dissented when a death sentence was upheld.19 Justice Brennan, who might

more than one person; [or]
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been offered or
has received anything of value for committing the murder.
Id. at 329 n.3 (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANNr. § 14:30 (1974)). For the same reason as those expressed
in Woodson, see supra note 180, the Court found this mandatory scheme violated the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. Id. at 336.
191. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305-06; (Stanislaus)Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. The concurrence of
Justice Brennan simply referred, without comment, to his dissent in Gregg.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Greggv. Georgia ...I concur in the
judgment that sets aside the death sentences imposed under the North Carolina death
sentence statute as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305-06. In (Stanislaus) Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336, he simply changed "North
Carolina" to "Louisiana."
192. After the 1976 term-and after Funnan-Justice Brennan wrote only two majority opinions
in death penalty cases: Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (jury instructions created a mandatory
presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion on the element of intent to the defendant in
violation of the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Sandstrom v. Montana, 422 U.S. 510 (1979));
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well have been speaking to future commentators, stated: "Just as we judge people
by their enemies, as well as their friends, their dislikes as well as their likes, the
principles they reject as well as the values they affirmatively maintain, so do we
look at judges' dissents, as well as their decisions for the court, as we evaluate
judicial careers."193
In many ways, Gregg merely set the stage for other far-reaching battles
regarding federalism and constitutional decisionmaking. In keeping with the
thrust of his McGautha dissent, Justice Brennan consistently fought, through his
concurrences and dissents, for an open federal forum in which death sentenced
inmates could raise their constitutional claims. Even though Greggallowed state
administered capital punishment schemes, Justice Brennan sought to insure that
they would be regulated by federal principles in federal courts.
Dissents, unlike majority opinions, do not "state" or "make" law. Their
purpose and focus is different.194 In its most basic form, the dissent serves as
disagreement, as legal counterpoint to the majority reasoning. "In its most
straightforward incarnation, the dissent demonstrates flaws the author perceives
in the majority's legal analysis. It is offered as a corrective-in the hope that the
Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case."195 This primary purpose
of a dissent "safeguards the integrity of the judicial decision-making process by
keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its
decision."196
Second, dissents exist to narrow the holding of the majority. Justice Brennan
believed such dissents existed to "emphasize the limits of a majority decision that
sweeps, so far as the dissenters are concerned, unnecessarily broadly-a sort of
'damage control' mechanism."' 97 Such dissents also illustrate holes in the
majority's reasoning or conclusions to like-minded litigators and lower
courts. 19

Finally, and most relevant to Justice Brennan's writing on death penalty issues,
"[t]he most enduring dissents ... [are those] ... that often reveal the perceived
congruence between the Constitution and the 'evolving standards of decency that

and South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S.Ct. 2207 (1989) (prosecutorial argument that capital defendant
deserved the death penalty because victim was a religious person and registered voter was irrelevant

to question of whether defendant deserved the death penalty, thus violating the eighth amendment
as interpreted in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). Each of these cases applied prior
precedent to the specific facts of the cases, only slightly enlarging the petitioners' relative rights.
193. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 427, 428 (1986). This article contains
the remarks of Justice Brennan delivered at the Third Annual Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture
at the University of California, Hastings College of Law, on November 18, 1985. Id. at 427.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 430.
196. Id "At the heart of that function is the critical recognition that vigorous debate improves
the final product by forcing the prevailing side to deal with the hardest questions urged by the losing
side." I4
197. Id.
198. Id. "[I]n my view, probably the most important development in constitutional jurisptiudence
today, dissents from federal courts may increasingly offer state courts legal theories that may be
relevant to the interpretation of their own state constitutions Id
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mark the progress of a maturing society,' and that seek to sow seeds for future
harvest." 99 Such dissents are not merely objections or attempts at narrowing
the scope of the majority opinion, they "soar with passion and ring with rhetoric
... [and], at their best, straddle the worlds of literature and the law."200 These
far-reaching dissents, dealing more with basic principles of constitutional law
than with the intricacies of a given case, speak not only to the petitioner and
respondent before the Court, they speak to a perceived constitutional future of
the United States.20' Such dissents attempt to insure a vigorous and growing
concept of constitutional adjudication. "For simply by infusing different ideas
and methods of analysis into judicial decision-making, dissents prevent that
process from becoming rigid or stale. And, each time the Court revisits an issue,
the justices are forced by a dissent to reconsider the fundamental questions and
to re-think the result."' 2
Justice Brennan's basic constitutional interpretation in the death penalty area,
as derived from his concurrence in Furman and dissent in Gregg, was absolute.z03 Once Justice Brennan reached this conclusion, his continuing dissent
to each death sentence before the Court was not only his objection to the
immediate decision but served also as his plea to the future. Each dissent by
Justice Brennan in capital cases "constitute[d] a statement by the judge as an
individual: 'Here I draw the line.'"204

199. Id. at 430-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
200. Id. at 431.
201. Id. at 436. "A dissent challenges the reasoning of the majority, tests its authority and
establishes a benchmark against which the majority's reasoning can continue to be evaluated, and
perhaps, in time, superseded." Id. at 435.
202. Id at 436.
203. See id. at 436-37:
[A]s I interpret the eighth amendment, its prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments embodies to a unique degree moral principles that substantively restrain
the punishments governments of our civilized society may impose on those convicted
of capital offenses. Foremost among the moral principles inherent in the constitutional
prohibition is the primary principle that the state, even as it punishes, must treat its
citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings. A
punishment must not be so severe as to be utterly and irreversibly degrading to the very
essence of human dignity. For... all legal decisions should advance, not degrade,
human dignity. Death for whatever crime and under all circumstances is a truly
awesome thing. The calculated killing of a human being by the state involves, by its
very nature, an absolute denial of the executed person's humanity. The most vile
murder does not, in my view, release the state from constitutional restraints on the
destruction of human dignity. Yet an executed person has lost the very right to have
rights, now or ever. For me, then, the fatal constitutional infirmity of capital
punishment is that it treats members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to
be toyed with and discarded. It is, in other words, "cruel and unusual" punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment.
204. Id. at 437. "Of course, as a member of a court, one's general duty is to acquiesce in the
rulings of that court and to take up the battle behind the court's new barricades. But it would be a
great mistake to confuse this unquestioned duty to obey and respect the law with an imagined
obligation to subsume entirely one's own views of constitutional imperatives to the views of the
majority." Id
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Justice Brennan's dissents in death penalty cases, after Gregg, combined
practical analysis and limitation of the majority's opinions with eloquent
statements of personal vision. Therefore, to analyze Justice Brennan's impact
on death penalty jurisprudence, it is necessary to look to his dissents to discover
his individual view and to reveal the impact he has had on this important
constitutional area.
A. FederalHabeas Review: A Stone Wall
In the same term that Gregg and its companion cases decided the eighth and
fourteenth amendments governed death penalty procedures, the Supreme Court
in Stone v. Powellm began an assault on state prisoners' available remedies in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.2
Although Justice Brennan was nearly

205.

428 U.S. 465 (1976).

206. Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from a state court criminal
judgment, are statutorily regulated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1977):
§ 2254. State custody; remedies in Federal courts
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there
is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law
of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written
opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct,
unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall
admit1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing,
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of
the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court
proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for
hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole
concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
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mute in the death penalty cases of that term, he stood defiant against the Court's
attempts to limit federal review of constitutional claims.
Powell, in its most direct ruling, held that fourth amendment claims seeking
application of the exclusionary rule2 were no longer cognizable in federal
habeas corpus proceedings.m The Court based its holding on the premise that
the "primary justification for the exclusionary rule... is the deterrence of police
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights."m9 The majority considered
the deterrent effect of federal habeas corpus review to be too slight in light of
the costs to society of federal implementation of that constitutional protection.210 After considering this balance of interests, the Court determined that
fourth amendment claims, seeking redress for violations of the exclusionary rule,
could only be litigated in federal court on direct review via a petition for writ of
certiorari.
Although the Court discussed the purpose of the exclusionary rule,21' and the

And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof
of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of
the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive,
is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or
unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that
the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support
such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by
convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
(e) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such State
court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual issue made
therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such determination. If the
applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to produce such part of the
record, then the State shall produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall
direct the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official. If the State
cannot provide such pertinent part of the record, then the court shall determine under
the existing facts and circumstances what weight shall be given to the State court's
factual determination.
(t) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of such
court to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable
written indicia showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be
admissible in the Federal court proceeding.
207. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (under federal constitutional law, a state must exclude
evidence from a trial if such evidence was gained as a result of a search that violated the fourth and
fourteenth amendments).
208. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494. "[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced
at his trial." Id (footnotes omitted).
209. Id at 486.
210. Id at 493-94. "Even if... some additional incremental deterrent effect would be present
in isolated cases, the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights
would be outweighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal
justice." Id The "costs" to which the Court referred was the diversion "from the ultimate question
of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding." Ma at 490
(footnote omitted). The diversion is created because the suppression of illegally seized evidence
might remove evidence of guilt from the state's case and free the guilty. Id
211. Id at 489-94.
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history of habeas corpus, 2 nowhere did the Court discuss the purpose of
federal habeas corpus review. Therefore, the Court's holding was perceived, at
least in part, as an oblique attack on the exclusionary rule.21 Justice Brennan,
in dissent, 21 4 analyzed the Court's fragile construct which allowed them to
eliminate these claims from federal habeas corpus jurisdiction:
I can only presume that the Court intends to be understood to hold
either that respondents are not, as a matter of statutory construction,
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United
States," or that "'considerations of comity and concerns for the
orderly administration of criminal justice,'" [428 U.S.] at 478 n.11, are
sufficient to allow this Court to rewrite jurisdictional statutes enacted
by Congress. Neither ground of decision is tenable; the former is
simply illogical, and the latter is an arrogation of power committed
solely to the Congress. 2
Rejecting these purported reasons for eliminating exclusionary rule claims from
federal purview, Justice Brennan focused his dissent on two emerging majority
themes: the limitation of the federal forum based on the relationship of the
claim and the accuracy of the factfinding proceeding, and the underlying purpose
of federal habeas corpus for state convicted inmates.
The Court in Powell discussed at length the fact that the exclusionary rule
usually worked to the benefit of a defendant by excluding the very evidence with
which they may be proven guilty.2 6 Justice Brennan, in dissent, identified this
necessary byproduct of enforcing the fourth amendment as the underlying reason
for its holding. 2 7 Differentiation of constitutional rights, based on their impact
on the accuracy of the factfinding proceeding, was a "novel reinterpretation of
the habeas statutes,"2 5 unacceptable to Justice Brennan:

212.

Id at 474-82.

213. Id at 496 (Burger, CJ., concurring); Id at 536 (White, J., dissenting). See also id at 502
(Brennan, J., dissenting): 'To be sure, my Brethren are hostile to the continued vitality of the
exclusionary rule as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures... ." Id
214. kI at 502 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissent in
PowelL
215. I4 at 504-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216.
A claim of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is crucially different
from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have
been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often this evidence
alone establishes beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty.
L at 490 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (Black, J., dissenting)).
217. Id at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 'Much in the Court's opinion suggests that a
construction of the habeas statutes to deny relief for non-'guilt-related' constitutional violations, based
on this Court's vague notions of comity and federalism... is the actual premise for today's decision.
... " IdL (citation omitted).
218. Id at 515.
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The procedural safeguards mandated in the Framers' Constitution are
not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they serve
functional purposes that ensure that the "guilty" are punished and the
"innocent" freed; rather, every guarantee enshrined in the Constitution, our basic charter and the guarantor of our most precious
liberties, is by it endowed with an independent vitality and value, and
this Court is not free to curtail those219constitutional guarantees even
to punish the most obviously guilty.
Once one right was diminished based upon its relationship to the determination
of the guilt of a defendant, then Justice Brennan saw habeas corpus ineluctably
disappearing as a forum for the protection of all constitutional rights. He
expressed his fears for the future stating, "I am therefore justified in apprehending that the groundwork is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal
habeas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention,
then at least for claims ...
ed.1' 220

that this Court later decides are not 'guilt relat-

To Justice Brennan, this artificial distinction between rights protected by
federal habeas corpus was antithetical to the very function and purpose of the
congressional grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction:
It is one thing to assert that state courts, as a general matter,
accurately decide federal constitutional claims; it is quite another to
generalize from that limited proposition to the conclusion that,
despite congressional intent that federal courts sitting in habeas must
stand ready to rectify any constitutional errors that are nevertheless
committed, federal courts are to be judicially precluded from ever
considering the merits of whole categories of rights that are to be
accorded less procedural protection merely because the Court
proclaims that they do not affect the accuracy or fairness of the

219. Id at 524.
220. Id at 517-18 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan identified the following areas as possible
targets of the Court's reasoning: double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Mirandaviolations,
and invalid identification procedures. Id He also identified other claims in the area of "official
surveillance of attorney-client communications, government acquisition of evidence through
unconscionable means ...denial of the right to a speedy trial, government administration of a 'truth
serum' . .. denial of the right to jury trial... or the obtaining of convictions under statutes that
." Id at 518 n.13 (citations omitted).
contravene First Amendment rights...
Justice Brennan's sense of the future impact that the majority's crimped reasoning would have on
the availability of federal habeas corpus relief to address other constitutional claims was a liefmotif
of his Powell dissent. See id. at 503 ("Today's holding portends substantial evisceration of federal
1);
idat 515 (The Court's decision "is particularly troubling in light of
habeas corpus jurisdiction ....
its portent for habeas jurisdiction generally.. . ."); id at 516 (The Court's "premises mark this case
as a harbinger of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes... ."); id at 516 n.12 (citing recent cases
as "proof that my fears concerning the precedential use to which today's opinion will be put are not
id at 535 C'[The potential ramifications of this case for federal habeas jurisdiction
groundless.... ID;
generally are ominous.").
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factfinding process.2'2
Further, Justice Brennan made apparent what severe constriction of available
remedies the reduction of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction occasioned.
Reliance on direct appellate review of constitutional claims in practice meant
that only one federal court, the Supreme Court, could consider such a claim, and
only if it chose to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan identified three problems with this reasoning. First, it was not
consistent with the congressional grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction: "[t]he
Court... simply ignores the settled principle that for purposes of adjudicating
constitutional claims Congress, which has the power to do so under Art. III of
the Constitution, has effectively cast the district courts sitting in habeas in the
role of surrogate Supreme Courts.tm Second, certiorari jurisdiction is seldom
utilized for the mere redress of a state's misinterpretation or misapplication of
a constitutional principle. m As Justice Brennan described:
Of course, federal review by certiorari in this Court is a matter of
grace, and it is grace now seldom bestowed at the behest of a
criminal defendant. I have little confidence that three others of the
Brethren would join in voting to grant such petitions, thereby
reinforcing the notorious fact that our certiorari jurisdiction is
inadequate for containing state criminal proceedings within constitutional bounds and underscoring Congress' wisdom in mandating
a
224
broad federal habeas jurisdiction for the district courts.
221. Id at 529. In the majority opinion, the Court stated: 'Despite differences in institutional
environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in
years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity
to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several states." Id at 494 n.35.
Justice Brennan pointed out that this rationale was insufficient to abrogate federal court
jurisdiction or to carve out an exception based on the impact on the factfinding procedures employed
at trial:
Enforcement of the federal constitutional rights that redress constitutional violations
directed against the "guilty' is a particular function of federal habeas review, lest judges
trying the "morally unworthy' be tempted not to execute the supreme law of the land.
State judges popularly elected may have difficulty resisting popular pressures not
experienced by federal judges given lifetime tenure designed to immunize them from
such influences, and the federal habeas statutes reflect the congressional judgment that
such detached federal review is a salutary safeguard against any detention of an
individual "in violation if the Constitution or laws ... of the United States."
I& at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
222.
d at 511-12 (footnote omitted). "Congress fashioned [habeas corpus] jurisdiction at least
in part to compensate for the inadequacies inherent in our certiorari jurisdiction on direct review."
Id. at 508 n.6.
223. See generally R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 188-253
(6th ed. 1986). "TIhe presence of... [a significant question of constitutional law], without more,
is not enough to warrant review by certiorari. The issues must be unsettled and important, a conflict
of decisions must exist, or the law on the matter must be such to warrant further consideration." Id
at 215.
224. Powell 465 U.S. at 534 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Brennan simply pointed to the absurdities that such an artificial
distinction, between federal habeas corpus and federal certiorari vindication,
might create: "[I]t escapes me as to what logic can support the assertion that the
defendant's unconstitutional confinement obtains during the process of direct
review, no matter how long that process takes, but that the unconstitutionality
then suddenly dissipates at the moment the claim is asserted in a collateral
attack on the conviction."225
Justice Brennan concluded that the majority's focus on the deterrent value of
the fourth amendment obscured the true evil produced by the opinion. The
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule was not, as a policy matter, the rule that
federal habeas corpus sought to enforce. Federal adjudication of constitutional
claims in post-conviction proceedings acted as deterrent to state courts' action
ensuring that they properly applied federal constitutional provisions. At bottom,
the right to federal habeas corpus review preserved federal constitutional
law. 6 "Ineffect, habeas jurisdiction is a deterrent to unconstitutional actions
by trial and appellate judges, and a safeguard to ensure that rights secured "under
the Constitution and federal laws are not merely honored in the breach. 2
The Court's evisceration of habeas corpus jurisdiction for claims under the
fourth amendment was not supported by the history and purpose of federal
habeas corpus, nor was it appropriate, considering the de facto absence of an
adequate federal forum in which to raise constitutional violations. The impact
of Powell on federal habeas corpus generally, was not to be realized in the
specific ways that Justice Brennan foretold.
However, his foreboding in
Powell took on a weighty gloom of substantial accuracy that was not imagined
even by the most creative opponents of the increasingly conservative Court.
Over the next fourteen years, until the very end of Justice Brennan's tenure on
the Court, the newly emergent majority limited the availability of federal habeas
corpus as a viable option for the redress of constitutional violations. The
gradual elimination of federal habeas corpus has had obvious impact on all
individuals convicted of a crime in a state court. For example, neither
respondent in Powellwas a death sentenced inmate and both remained confined
in spite of admitted constitutional violations.
The availability of habeas corpus, or more specifically its limitation, has
particularly impacted state prisoners sentenced to die. The reasons are many.
First, after Furman and Gregg, the administration of the death penalty,
particularly the now-required bifurcated sentencing procedure, was entirely a

225. Id. at 509-10 (footnote omitted). It is not difficult to imagine two identically situated
defendants receiving disparate treatment for identical claims due to their choice of forum. See id. at
536-37 (White, J.,
dissenting) (presenting hypothetical of two co-defendants, who, because they chose
different paths of federal review-one certiorari and the other federal habeas-received disparate
treatment in the courts).
226. "Tosanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting society
from law-breakers is to make government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our
ultimate freedom and liberty depend. Id. at 524.
227. IA at 521.
228. Id. at 517-18 n.13.
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product of, and subject to, federal constitutional principles. Early in the
constitutional development of the law governing capital punishment, Justice
Brennan, in McGautha,defined the central constitutional issue as not only one
of standards but also of rational reviewability in federal courts. This view
prevailed and the entire administration of states' death penalty schemes was
"federalized"-any and all state indiscretions necessarily gave rise to federal
constitutional claims. Second, because of the severity and infamy of the crimes
involved, if state courts were ever subject to political pressures to uphold
convictions and sentences, it was in death penalty cases. Further, the adage that
"death is different" applied to the availability and quality of review as well as to
the protective procedures at trial. Limitation or elimination of the available
federal forum for those sentenced to die results not only in unconstitutional
confinement, as in Powell, but unconstitutional execution.
The initial assault on habeas corpus, as evidenced by Powell, continued over
the remainder of Justice Brennan's tenure with the Court. Of the cases that
shaped the contours of current federal habeas corpus availability, some involved
non-death sentenced inmates and many dealt specifically with the particular
constitutional protections afforded to a state inmate facing a sentence of death
after Furman and Gregg. The result was a system of federal litigation where
death sentenced inmates often had to fight more tenaciously to have the merits
of their claims heard than to actually convince federal courts, once reached, of
the harm caused by constitutional violations in their case.
B. Blaming the Defendant
Some of the Court's most important decisions regarding the scope of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction have included a dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan.
His view regarding the availability of habeas corpus, like his view that death is
barred as a punishment by the eighth amendment, has not wavered since 1976.
Subsequent cases, brought by both those sentenced to death and those sentenced
to a term of years, further illustrate the Court's increased actions closing the
door to federal habeas corpus. These cases also illuminate Justice Brennan's
continued commitment to keeping open the door to rational federal review for
death sentenced inmates.
During the 1976 Term, the Court continued the restrictions of federal habeas
corpus begun in Powell. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 9 instead of finding other nonguilt related areas to carve from habeas consideration,m the Court focused on

229. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
230.

On October 12, 1976, at the beginning of the 1976 Term, certiorari was granted in Sykes

"to consider the availability of federal habeas corpus to review a state convict's claim that testimony
was admitted at his trial in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona." Id at 74 (citation
omitted). Wainwright v. Sykes, 429 U.S. 883 (Oct. 12, 1976) (memorandum granting certiorari).
Considering the Sykes grant of certiorari on the heels of the Powel decision at the end of the previous
term, Justice Brennan's fears seemed immediately realized. Justice Rehnquist, writing the Court's
opinion, enigmatically left the issue for a future date:
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the effect of state procedural bars on federal habeas corpus review.23 Writing
for the Court, Justice Rehnquist identified four significant questions in
determining whether a federal court should consider a petition for writ of habeas

corpus urged by a prisoner:
(1) What types of federal claims may a federal habeas court properly

consider?

(2) Where a federal claim is cognizable hy a federal

habeas court, to what extent must that court defer to a resolution of
the claim in prior state proceedings? (3) To what extent must the
petitioner who seeks federal habeas exhaust state remedies before
resorting to the federal court? (4) In what instances will an adequate
and independent state ground bar consideration of otherwise
cognizable federal issues on federal habeas review?232
Only the fourth ground, relating to state procedural bars, was implicated in
Sykes.2 3 The Court rejected the earlier, "deliberate by-pass" standard of Fay

Petitioner does not argue, and we do not pause to consider, whether a bare allegation
of a Mirandaviolation, without accompanying assertions going to the actual voluntariness or reliability of the confession, is a proper subject for consideration on federal
habeas review, where there has been a full and fair opportunity to raise the argument
in the state proceeding.
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 n.11.
This issue is still unresolved, although it has not disappeared from the Court's writings. See
Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1989) (O'Connor & Scalia, JJ., concurring). In
Duckworth, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote to suggest that "the rationale of our
decision in Stone v. Powell, dictates that the suppression remedy [under Miranda] be unavailable to
respondent on federal habeas." Id. at 2881 (citation omitted).
231. In Sykes, the respondent was convicted of third degree murder after a trial in which an
inculpatory statement by Sykes was introduced. Sykes' defense attorney did not object to the
introduction of the statements at trial, nor did the trial judge question their constitutionality or hold
a hearing to determine their admissibility. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74-75. The issue of the admissibility
of these statements was not raised until Mr. Sykes sought collateral review in the state courts. His
claim that he did not understand his Mirandawarning, due to intoxication, was dismissed for failure
of his trial counsel to object during trial and comply with Florida's contemporaneous objection rule.
Sykes subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking
relief on the ground, inter alia, that his statements were improperly admitted at trial. The federal
district court hearing Sykes' claim ordered a hearing on the confession issue, noting that "only
'exceptional circumstances' of 'strategic decisions at trial' can create such a bar to raising federal
constitutional claims in a federal habeas action." Id. at 76. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
substantially agreed with the district court's ruling, but added, "the failure to comply with the rule
requiring objection at the trial would only bar review of the suppression claim where the right to
object was deliberately bypassed for reasons relating to trial tactics." Id at 77.
232. Id at 78-79. In each of these areas, the Court has limited, rather than expanded, the
availability of federal habeas review. See Stone, 428 U.S. 465 (excluding federal claims based on the
fourth amendment from federal habeas corpus review) (see supra notes 205-28 and accompanying
text); Sumner (Sumner II) v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (reversed for Court of Appeals to give proper
deference (under 28 U.S.C. § 2254) to findings of fact regarding pre-trial identification procedures);
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (federal habeas court cannot consider a petition unless all claims
are totally exhausted). Sykes and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), are the two lead cases limiting
federal habeas corpus review when a state procedural bar is imposed between a claim and federal
review.
233. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81.
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v. Noia for a more limited "cause and prejudice" exception to state procedural bar preclusion of federal habeas corpus review.2 5 In effect, Sykes decided
that an independent and adequate state procedural bar would preclude federal
habeas corpus review of federal constitutional issues. z 3 In support of this
conclusion, the Court considered certain policy considerations that militated in
favor of state procedural bars. 7 One conclusion of the Court was that the
deliberate by-pass standard of Noia, would "encourage 'sandbagging' on the part
of defense lawyers, who [might] take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in
a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a federal
habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off."2 This presumed defense
strategy was undesirable to the Court because it would shift the focus of

234. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Noia, presented an
exhaustive analysis of the history of habeas corpus in England and the United States ending with the
Congressional codification of the right to federal habeas corpus review enacted in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Regarding the basic purpose for habeas corpus review, Justice Brennan wrote:
Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable
to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to
conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his
immediate release. Thus there is nothing novel in the fact that today habeas corpus in
the federal courts provides a mode for the redress of denials of due process of law.
Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office.
IA at 402. The conclusion in Noia was that state procedural bars would not prevent plenary federal
habeas corpus review of constitutional claims unless the state could prove that the defense
purposefully failed to raise the claim in state court in an attempt to "deliberately bypass" the state
forum:
We therefore hold that the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an
applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and
in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.
Id at 438. The standard by which federal judges were to judge deliberate by-pass was made "very
clear":
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise,
understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal
claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can
fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to
the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain
his federal claims on the merits....
I at 439. Noia further held that a "state court's finding of waiver [does not] bar independent
determination of the question by the federal courts on habeas, for waiver affecting federal rights is
a federal question." Id
235. Syke, 433 U.S. at 86-87.
236. Id at 87.
237. Id at 87-89. The reasons favoring the procedural bar application included: "A
contemporaneous objection enables the record to be made with respect to the constitutional claim
when the recollections of witnesses are freshest. . . *"; "[i]t enables the judge who observed the
demeanor of those witnesses to make the factual determinations necessary for properly deciding the
federal constitutional question .. ."; and "[it] may lead to the exclusion of the evidence objected to,
thereby making a major contribution to finality in criminal litigation." Id at 88-89.
238. Id at 89.
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litigation away from the trial and into federal court habeas litigation.239 The
majority felt that state proceedings, particularly the trial, should be considered
the "'main event' ..,rather than a 'tryout on the road' for what will later be the
determinative federal habeas hearing."m Therefore, because of "'considerations
of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice,'"2 41
the Court abandoned the deliberate by-pass rule in favor of the cause and
prejudice standard.24 Although the Court did not define what "cause" or
"prejudice" meant,24 the Court assured future litigants that the standard would
not be used to work a "miscarriage of justice."2"
Justice Brennan, in dissent, examined and exposed each of the majority's points
in a carefully constructed defense of the Noia by-pass standard. 24 Justice
Brennan began his analysis in Sykes with a question that was already answered
in Noia:
What is the meaning and import of a procedural default? If it could
be assumed that a procedural default more often than not is the
product of a defendant's conscious refusal to abide by the duly
constituted, legitimate processes of the state courts, then I might
agree that a regime of collateral review weighted in favor of a State's
procedural rules would be warranted. [Noia], however, recognized
that such rarely is the case; and therein lies [Noia's] basic unwillingness to embrace a view of habeas jurisdiction that results in "an
airtight system of [procedural] forfeitures."m
The parents of procedural defaults were, in most instances, "inadvertence,

negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial counsel."247 These defaults

occurred with no notice or explanation to, or waiver by, the defendant who was
the only party injured by their application to valid claims:
Punishing a lawyer's unintentional errors by closing the federal
courthouse door to his client is both a senseless and misdirected
method of deterring the slighting of state rules. It is senseless

239. IL at 90. 'The failure of the federal habeas courts generally to require compliance with a
contemporaneous-objection rule tends to detract from the perception of the trial of a criminal case
in state court as a decisive and portentous event." Id
240. Id
241. Id at 84 (quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976). But see Noia, 372
U.S. at 424 which states: "[Clonventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted

to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be
denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.'
242.

Sykes 433 U.S. at 90-91.

243. Id. at 91.
244.

Id The term miscarriage of justice was left undefined.

dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
245. Id at 99 (Brennan, J.,
246. Id at 101 (quoting Noia, 372 U.S. at 432).
247. Id at 104.
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because unplanned and unintentional action of any kind generally is
not subject to deterrence; and, to the extent that it is hoped that a
threatened sanction addressed to the defense will induce greater care
and caution on the part of trial lawyers, thereby forestalling negligent
conduct or error, the potential loss of all valuable state remedies
would be sufficient to this end. And it is a misdirected sanction
because even if the penalization of incompetence or carelessness will
encourage more thorough legal training and trial preparation, the
habeas applicant, as opposed to his lawyer, hardly is the proper
recipient of such a penalty.m
As illuminated by Justice Brennan, the rule applied by the majority in Sykes
worked only to the detriment of the defendant. The elimination of federal
review of claims found to be excluded by independent state procedural bars
neither insured effective assistance of counsel, nor improved the accuracy or
constitutionality of the trial court proceedings. 2 9 Failures of counsel that
resulted in procedural bar of any claim in state court, after Sykes, resulted in no
federal review, let alone relief.2s0 The majority standard made the criminal
defendant responsible for the preservation of his own claims. This ultimately
suggested that the individual on trial must in fact be the attorney who represents
his cause.7s1 Because this rarely described the ability of criminal defendants,
the punishment (procedural bar of defendant's claim) in no way fit the crime

248. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
249. See id. at 116:
[Tjhe solution that today's decision risks embracing seems to me the most unfair of all:
the denial of any judicial consideration of the constitutional claims of a criminal
defendant because of errors made by his attorney which lie outside the power of the
habeas petitioner to prevent or deter and for which, under no view of morality or
ethics, can he be held responsible.
250.

See id. at 110-11:

The threatened creation of a more "airtight system of forfeitures" would effectively
deprive habeas petitioners of the opportunity for litigating their constitutional claims
before any forum and would disparage the paramount importance of constitutional
rights in our system of government.
251.

See id. at 113-14:

Especially with fundamental constitutional rights at stake, no fictional relationship of
principal-agent or the like can justify holding the criminal defendant accountable for
the naked errors of his attorney. This is especially true when so many indigent
defendants are without any realistic choice in selecting who ultimately represents them
at trial. Indeed, if responsibility for error must be apportioned between the parties, it
is the State, through its attorney's admissions and certification policies, that is more
fairly held to blame for the fact that practicing lawyers too often are ill-prepared or illequipped to act carefully and knowledgeably when faced with decisions governed by
state procedural requirements.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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(inadvertent failure of counsel)252
Justice Brennan, in addition to criticizing the effects of the imposition of
procedural bar on the defendant in any case, also attacked the majority's
underlying reasons for their result. The majority, in creating the cause and
prejudice standard, reversed the burden of proof under Noia: where the State
was previously required to prove that defendant waived the claim through "'an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or prvilege,'" 23
the defendant was now required to prove that there was cause for failing to raise
the claim earlier and prove that she was prejudiced by that failure.2 4 To
support this reversal, the majority insinuated that the wily defense attorney
would "sandbag" and hold back his meritorious constitutional claim for later
federal court adjudication. Regarding this negative assumption, Justice Brennan
observed that "the Court point[ed] to no cases or commentary arising during the

past 15 years of actual use of the [Noia] test to support this criticism."2
The function of the Noia by-pass test was to discover those rare instances
where trial counsel in fact perceived a claim and decided nonetheless to forgo
the claim on the chance that he or she might prevail in the future.256 The
majority's new "cause and prejudice" standard shifted the burden from the state
to the defendant to prove that there was some reason for trial counsel's failure
to raise a constitutional claim at the first possible instance. The majority thereby
punished anything less than defense counsel's perfection based on an assumption
of defense counsel's poor judgment and poor character. z7 Justice Brennan
analyzed the
necessary implication of the majority's cynical view and revealed its
5a
absurdityY

252. Id.
253. Id at 102 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
254. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
255. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
256. See id. at 101-02: "[The very purpose of... [the Noa] by-pass test [was] to detect and
enforce such intentional procedural forfeitures of outstanding constitutionally based claims."
257. I
258. Id at 103 n.5:
In brief, the defense lawyer would face two options: (1) He could elect to present his
constitutional claims to the state courts in a proper fashion. If the state trial court is
persuaded that a constitutional breach has occurred, the remedies dictated by the
Constitution would be imposed, the defense would be bolstered, and the prosecution
accordingly weakened, perhaps precluded altogether. If the state court rejects the
properly tendered claims, the defense has lost nothing: Appellate review before the
state courts and federal habeas consideration are preserved. (2) He could elect to
"sandbag." This presumably means, first, that he would hold back the presentation of
his constitutional claim to the trial court, thereby increasing the likelihood of a
conviction since the prosecution would be able to present evidence that, while arguably
constitutionally deficient, may be highly prejudicial to the defense. Second, he would
thereby have forfeited all state review and remedies with respect to these claims
(subject to whatever "plain error" rule is available). Third, to carry out his scheme, he
would now be compelled to deceive the federal habeas court and to convince the judge
that he did not "deliberately bypass" the state procedures. If he loses on his gamble,
all federal review would be barred, and his "sandbagging" would have resulted in
nothing but the forfeiture of all judicial review of his client's claims. The Court,
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Because the majority failed to address what either "cause" or "prejudice"
meant,2s9 Justice Brennan identified the "thorny question"M left by the
majority opinion: "How should the federal habeas court treat a procedural
default in a state court that is attributable purely and simply to the error or
Under Noia, the answer was
negligence of a defendant's trial counsel?"
clear: the federal court would review the claim.M Under Sykes, a different
outcome was likelyY6

without substantiation, apparently believes that a meaningful number of lawyers are
induced into option 2 by [Nola]. I do not. That belief simply offends common sense.
259. 'Vhatever precise content may be given those terms by later cases, we feel confident in
holding without further elaboration that they do not exist here." Id at 91.
Hence, as of today, all we know of the "cause" standard is its requirement that habeas
applicants bear an undefined burden of explanation for the failure to obey the state
rule.... Left unresolved is whether a habeas petitioner like Sykes can adequately
discharge this burden by offering the commonplace and truthful explanation for his
default: attorney ignorance or error beyond the client's control. The "prejudice"
inquiry, meanwhile, appears to bear a strong resemblance to harmless-error doctrine.
Id. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted).
260. Id at 100.
261. Id
262. Id. at 107-08.
263. Id at 90-91. After Sykes, the issue identified by Justice Brennan remained unresolved for
some time. In 1982, the Court decided Isaac, 456 U.S. 107. Following Justice Brennan's dissent in
Sykes, several lower courts applied the Sykes standard in a way that allowed proof of inadvertent acts
of counsel, novelty, or futility caused by longstanding adverse application and interpretation of state
law to satisfy the "cause" prong of the test. See, ,e., Isaac, 456 U.S. at 118 (en banc Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held proof of "futility' of raising claim was sufficient to satisfy "cause" prong of

Sykes).

Petitioner Isaac sought relief in federal court for a claim that the jury instructions at his trial
improperly shifted the burden on the issue of the affirmative defense of self-defense. Isaac, 456 U.S.
at 116-17. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc noted:
Ohio had consistently required defendants to prove affirmative defenses by a
preponderance of the evidence... The futility of objecting to this established practice
supplied adequate cause for Isaac's waiver. Prejudice, the second prerequisite for
excusing a procedural default, was "clear" since the burden of proof is a critical element
of factfinding, and since Isaac had made a substantial issue of self defense.

Id at 118 (citing Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1134 (6th Cir. 1980)).

Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Isaac, held that the "cause" prong of the Sykes test
was not met, even where the claim would have been summarily dismissed at the time of trial: ITihe
futility of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for a failure to
object at trial." Id. at 130. Regarding novelty, the Court held that there were, at least in other state
courts, other defense attorneys litigating issues similar to the one raised by Isaac. Therefore, the
Court concluded that it could not "say that respondents lacked the tools to construct their
constitutional claim." Id. at 133 (footnote omitted). The Court further refused to limit the Sykes
standard to those claims that do not impact the truthfinding function of the trial. Id at 129.
Justice Brennan sharply dissented and wrote "[t]he Court's analysis is completely result-oriented,
and represents a noteworthy exercise in the very judicial activism that the Court so deprecates in
other contexts." Id at 137, 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent begins with an analysis of the
Court's use of its own version of Isaac's claim to its own ends: "In short, the Court reshapes
respondent Isaac's actual claim into a form that enables it to foreclose all federal review...." Id at
143.
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In the end, Justice Brennan's primary complaint with the majority's reasoning
and conclusion was the obvious impact that the new burden and standard would
have on the resolution of meritorious constitutional claims in federal courts:
"[Tlhe only thing clear about the Court's 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard is that
it exhibits the notable tendency of keeping prisoners in jail without addressing
their constitutional complaints."2 Federal court review would be dictated by

Justice Brennan then addressed the substance of the Court's holding:
Sykes did not give the terms "cause" and "prejudice" any "precise content," but promised
that "later cases" would provide such content. [Sykes, 433 U.S.] at 91. Today the
nature of that content becomes distressingly apparent. The Court still refuses to say
what "cause" ir And I predict that on the Court's present view it will be prove easier
for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a state prisoner to show "cause."
But on the other hand, the Court is more than eager to say what "cause" is not ....
Id at 144. "Cause," for the majority was "not demonstrated" when petitioner had some tools to
fashion the claim "however primitive those tools were and thus however inchoate the claim was when
petitioners were in the state courts." Id at 14445. Justice Brennan recognized that this standard
would eliminate all claims from federal review that were futile or not yet recognized in state courts.
"To hold the present respondents to such a high standard of foresight is tantamount to a complete
rejection of the notion that there is a point before which a claim is so inchoate that there is adequate
'cause' for the failure to raise it." Ifd Ultimately, Brennan's dissent recognized that the elevated
standard of Isaac worked the same evil as that created by the original pronouncement of Sykes.
It is inimical to the principle of federal constitutional supremacy to defer to state
courts' "frustration" at the requirements of federal constitutional law as it is interpreted
in an evolving society. Sykes promised that its cause-and-prejudice standard would "not
prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal
constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be
the victim of a miscarriage of justice." Today's decision, with its unvarnished hostility
to the assertion of federal constitutional claims, starkly reveals the emptiness of that
promise.
Id at 148 (citation omitted).
The only issue remaining afterIsaac's limitations of the Sykes "cause" and "prejudice" standard was
whether absolute novelty of a claim was sufficient to meet the "cause" prong of the Sykes standard.
See id. at 131. As proof of the value of dissent and continued adherence to basic principles of
constitutional law, Justice Brennan was able to later lead a majority that held "novelty" satisfied the
"cause" prerequisite of Sykes. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). Again examining an issue regarding
the allotment of the burden of proof at trial, Justice Brennan held that Ross's claim was not barred
in federal court because, at the time of his trial in 1969, the right complained of had not been
recognized. Finding only a few possible cases upon which to even begin to build a claim, Justice
Brennan held that the available tools must provide "a reasonable basis upon which [a petitioner] could
have realistically appealed his conviction." Id at 19. Justice Brennan concluded that the "claim was
sufficiently novel ... to excuse his attorney's failure to raise the... issue." Id at 20. Therefore, the
"cause" prong of the Sykes test was met. Id
264. Id at 116. Justice Brennan anticipated the Court's application of the Sykes standard to
simple inadvertence:
If the standard adopted today is later construed to require that the simple mistakes of
attorneys are to be treated as binding forfeitures, it would serve to subordinate the
fundamental rights contained in our constitutional charter to inadvertent defaults of
rules promulgated by state agencies, and would essentially leave it to the States, through
the enactment of procedure and the certification of the competence of local attorneys,
to determine whether a habeas applicant will be permitted the access to the federal
forum that is guaranteed him by Congress.
Id at 107 (footnote omitted).
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state action, both in the enactment of procedural bars and in the selection and
maintenance of the bar.m Defendants would no longer be protected by the
federal courts, but would suffer the penalties for their attorneys' inadequacies.
This refrain was oft repeated throughout the remainder of Justice Brennan's
tenure on the Supreme Court in many different contexts that would impact upon
federal review for death sentenced inmates.
C. Death-QualifiedJuries: Let the Tral Courts Do It
As the Court was narrowing the availability of federal habeas corpus
petitioners in general, changes also were being made in death penalty jurisprudence to further bar consideration of those petitioners' claims. In Wainwrightv.
Witt,2 the Court re-examined the long standing rules regarding juror exclusion
first annunciated in Witherspoon v. Illinois.20 In Witherspoon, decided four
years before Furman, a very different Supreme Court had held the States to a
very strict standard of proof before a juror with scruples against the death
penalty could be constitutionally removed for cause.m After the death penalty
had been reinstated, attorneys for death sentenced inmates continued to use the
standard announced in Witherspoon to seek and secure reversals of their
convictions in federal habeas courts269 To put an end to such results, the
Supreme Court both changed the standard for reviewing Witherspoon claims and
held that trial court determinations in such cases would be afforded deference
in federal habeas corpus, thereby completely eviscerating federal review of such
juror exclusion claims.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Witt, began by limiting the

265.

It at 107.

266.
267.
268.

469 U.S. 412 (1985).
391 U.S. 510 (1968). See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44.

269. See, eg, Witt, 469 U.S. at 415-16. After Vitt was tried for capital murder, convicted, and
sentenced to die, the litigation of his Witherspoon claim began:
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court respondent raised a number of claims, one
of which was that several prospective jurors had been improperly excluded for cause
because of their opposition to capital punishment, in violation of this Court's decision
in Witherspoon.... The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence,
and this Court denied certiorari. After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction
review in the state courts, ... respondent filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, raising numerous
constitutional claims. That court denied the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and granted the writ [on Witherpoon grounds]. [Witt
v. Wainwright,] 714 F.2d 1069 (1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (1984).

I4 at 415 (citations omitted). As evidenced by the proceedings in Witt's case, it was a federal court
that finally vindicated his meritorious Witherspoon claim.
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seminal Witherspoon case to its factsz0 and reduced its holding to "dicta."27'
Relying on a cut and paste analysis of Lockett v. Ohiom and Adams v. Texasp the majority found that "[t]he state of this case law leaves trial courts
with the difficult task of distinguishing between prospective jurors whose
opposition to capital punishment will not allow them to apply the law or view
the facts impartially and jurors who, though opposed to capital punishment, will
nevertheless conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at triaL"274 The
Court ultimately sided with the State's interests in this equation.
Abandoning the strict standard of Witherspoon it adopted language from
Adams as the new standard for analyzing juror exclusion claims:
Although this task may be difficult in any event, it is obviously made
more difficult by the fact that the standard applied in Adams differs
markedly from the language of footnote 21. The tests with respect
to sentencing and guilt, originally in two prongs, have been merged;
the requirement that a juror may be excluded only if he would never
vote for the death penalty is now missing; gone too is the extremely
high burden of proof. In general, the standard has been simplified2s
The more disturbing aspect of Witt for death sentenced habeas petitioners was
the majority's holding that put the entire issue into the hands of the state trial
judge, thus "de-regulating" the federal control over this aspect of death penalty

270. Id. at 418. Witherspoon was "seminal" in light of its history (see supra Section II) and in
light of the number of individuals granted relief under its standard. It is also seminal because of its
application of federal standards and review to the death qualified juries in state death penalty
proceedings. See generaly Burt, Disorderin the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L REv. 1741, 1746-50 (1987). It was a case born of an era where federal constitutional
concerns outweighed the desire for rapid executions.
271. "[Tlhe statements in the Witherspoon footnotes are in any event dicta. The Court's holding
focused only on circumstances under which prospective jurors could not be excluded; under
Witherspoon's facts it was unnecessary to decide when they could be." Id. at 422 (emphasis in
dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.). "[T1he label 'dictum'
original). But see, id. at 439, 455 (Brennan, J.,
does not begin to convey the status that the restrictions embodied in footnote 21 [of Witherspoon]
have achieved in this Court and state and federal courts over the last decade and a half." Id
272. 438 U.S. 586(1978). In Lockett, the Court found that jurors were properly excluded when
they made it unmistakably clear that their scruples against the death penalty prevented them from
abiding by existing law and following the instructions of the trial judge. Id- at 596. The Court, in
Lockett, also unmistakably adopted the standard of Witherspoon's footnote 21. Md.
273. 448 U.S. 38 (1980). InAdams, the Court reversed the sentence of the petitioner because
jurors had been excluded on the basis of their refusal to take an oath which required them, inter alia,
to promise that the mandatory penalty of death would not affect their deliberations. Id at 42. As
in Lockett, the Court favorably relied on Witherspoon's footnote 21. Id. at 44. The Court held that
"a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath." Id at 45.
274. Witt, 469 U.S. at 421.
275. Id at 421.
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administration2 6 The Court relied on Patton v. Yount, n decided only a year
earlier, which had held a trial judge's findings, regarding the exclusion for cause
of a juror on grounds of bias, were findings of fact requiring federal court
deference under section 2254(d).z8 The Court then determined that capital
trial juror exclusion under Witherspoon, now that the Court had "simplified" the
standard, was no different than determinations of bias. 9 From there, the
Court took a quick step that all but precluded federal review of juror exclusion
claims:
Once it is recognized that excluding prospective capital sentencing
jurors because of their opposition to capital punishment is no
different from excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which
result in bias, Patton must control. The trial judge is of course
applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears, but
his predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate
record. These are "factual issues" that are subject to § 2254(d).m
Justice Brennan assailed the Court on both points. 281 One of only three
remaining members of the Court sitting when Witherspoon was decided, 2
Justice Brennan re-urged the sixth amendment basis for that decision.? The
Witherspoon Court considered the constitutional interests of the defendant who
faced the death penalty superior to the interests of the State which sought his

276.

See Burt, supra note 270, at 1785. See also generally Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983

SuP. Cr. REv. 305.
277.

278.
279.
280.
281.
irrelevant

467 U.S. 1025 (1984).

Id at 1038 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
Witt, 469 U.S. at 429.
Id
Id at 439 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also took issue with the Court's wholly
discussion of the facts of the underlying capital murder

The Court has depicted the lurid details of respondent Witt's crime with the careful
skill of a pointillist. Had the Court been equally diligent in rendering the holding
below, it might not have neglected to mention that, as in every case of a violation of
Witherspoon ... only the defendant's death sentence and not his conviction was vacated.
However heinous Witt's crime, the majority's vivid portrait of its gruesome details has

no bearing on the issue before us. It is not for this Court to decide whether Witt
deserves to die. That decision must first be made by a jury of his peers, so long as the
jury is impartial and drawn from a fair cross section of the community in conformity
with the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id at 440 n.1. '
282.
283.

The other two were Justice Marshall and Justice White.
Witt, 469 U.S. at 439.
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death.
The import of these sixth amendment jury rights, particularly in
capital cases, encouraged the Court to require "the State to make an exceptionally strong showing that a prospective juror's views about the death penalty will
result in actual bias toward the defendant before permitting exclusion of the
juror for cause."m This strict standard prevented the State from having an
advantage by stacking a jury and creating a panel that was "uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to die."2u
The Witherspoon standard was not a product of offhand dicta, as suggested by
the majority, but was a reasoned attempt to standardize and make states'
death qualification practices rationally reviewable. Justice Brennan saw the
Court's decision in Witt not as the "simplification" it disingenuously proclaimed
itself,2 but as a well planned move to end federal review of death qualified
juror exclusion claims:
The crucial departure is the decision to discard Witherspoon's

284.

Id at 444-45:

[U]ntil today-we viewed the risks to a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from a jury
from which those who oppose capital punishment have been excluded as far more
serious than the risk to the State from inclusion of particular jurors whose views about
the death penalty might turn out to predispose them toward the defendant, we placed
on the State an extremely high burden to justify exclusion.
285.

Id at 439. Justice Brennan also noted:

Three important consequences flow from Witherspoon'sstringent standard for exclusion.
First, it permits exclusion only of jurors whose views would prevent or substantially
impair them from following instructions or abiding by an oath, and not those whose
views would simply make these tasks more psychologically or emotionally difficult ...
• Second, it precludes exclusion of jurors whose voir dire responses to deathqualification inquiries are ambiguous or vacillating.... Third, it precludes exclusion
of jurors who do not know at voirdire whether their views about the death penalty will
prevent them abiding by their oaths at trial.
Id at 443-44.
286. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521. See also Wit, 469 U.S. at 446. "We have repeatedly stressed
that the essence of Witherspoon is its requirement that only jurors who make it unmistakably clear
that their views about capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair them from following
the law may be excluded." Id (citing Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970), and Boulden v.
Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969)).
287. See supra note 271.
288. Justice Brennan commented on the inability to rationally review any determinations of trial
judges in these circumstances because of their completely subjective nature:
[Tihe Court goes on to ascribe to the trial judge the power to divine through demeanor
alone which of such jurors "would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law"
...and requires deference to the trial-court decisions to exclude for this reason. Not
surprisingly, the Court provides no support for the rather remarkable assertion that a
judge will, despite ambiguity in a juror's response, be able to perceive a juror's inability
to follow the law and abide by an oath when the juror himself or herself does not yet
know how he or she will react to the case at hand.
Id at 453 n.9 (quoting the majority opinion in Wit, 469 U.S. at 426).
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stringent standards of proof. The Court no longer prohibits exclusion
of uncertain, vacillating, or ambiguous prospective jurors. It no
longer requires an unmistakably clear showing that a prospective
juror will be prevented or substantially impaired from following
instructions and abiding by an oath. Instead the trial judge at voir
dire is instructed to evaluate juror uncertainty, ambiguity, or
vacillation to decide whether the juror's views about capital punishment "might frustrate administration of a State's death penalty
scheme."m
Justice Brennan exposed this departure as the means to the true end of the
Court-bringing questions of juror qualification within the "factual issue"
limitation on federal habeas corpus jurisdiction: 2
Had the Court maintained Witherspoon's strict standards for deathqualification, there would be no question that trial-court decisions to
exclude scrupled jurors would not be questions of fact subject to the
presumption of correctness. Whether a prospective juror with
qualms about the death penalty expressed an inability to abide by an
oath with sufficient strength and clarity to justify exclusion is
certainly a "mixed question"-an application of a legal standard to
undisputed historical fact.291
Only after the majority eliminated the Witherspoon standard was it possible to
claim death qualification determinations were "factual issues" and not legal
concusions. 292 This conclusion in turn eliminated federal review of death
qualification claims and made death penalty jury selection standardless under the
Constitution because it was exempt from rational federal review.2
The continuing assault on the federal review of claims raised by state inmates,
particularly those under the sentence of death, spurred Justice Brennan in his
dissent in Witt to identify three continuing themes in the majority's constitutional
criminal law jurisprudence:
Today's opinion for the Court is the product of a saddening confluence of three of the most disturbing trends in our constitutional

289. I at 452 (quoting the majority opinion in Wi', 469 U.S. at 416) (emphasis in original).
290. See id. at 461-62. "[The Court's] discussion of the proper standard of review of state-court
Wtherspoon determinations cannot pass without some comment. One evident purpose of the Court's
redefinition of the standards governing death-qualification is to bring review of death-qualification
questions within the scope of the presumption of correctness of state-court factual findings on federal
collateral review.' Id.
291. Id at 462.
292. Id.
293. Since Witt, there have been no federal cases overturning a death sentence based on a state
trial court's erroneous determination that a specific juror was excludable for cause under the majority
standard.
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jurisprudence respecting the fundamental rights of our people. The
first is the Court's unseemly eagerness to recognize the strength of
the State's interest in efficient law enforcement and to make
expedient sacrifices of the constitutional rights of the criminal
defendant to such interests. The second is the Court's increasing
disaffection with the previously unquestioned principle, endorsed by
every Member of this Court, that "because of its severity and
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any
other punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique
safeguards ...

."

The third is the Court's increasingly expansive

definition of "questions of fact" calling for application of the
presumption of correctness of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to thwart
vindication of fundamental rights in the federal courts.2
Wt illustrated the grand meeting of these hostile concepts. The result, for
Justice Brennan, was no less than a constitutional crisis for the individual who
stands in opposition to the State:
These trends all reflect the same desolate truth: we have lost our
sense of the transcendent importance of the Bill of Rights to our
society. We have lost too our sense of our own role as Madisonian
"guardians" of these rights. Like the death-qualified juries that the
prosecution can now mold to its will to enhance the chances of
victory, this Court increasingly acts as the adjunct of the State and its
prosecutors in facilitating efficient and expedient conviction and
execution irrespective of the Constitution's fundamental guarantees.
One can only hope that this day too will soon pass.2
For the remainder of Justice Brennan's tenure, the only things that "passed" were
open federal habeas corpus jurisdiction2 and principled application of the

294. 1d. at 462-63 (citations omitted).
295. Id at 463 (citations omitted).
, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (Sykes rule regarding "cause" and
296. See
"prejudice" applied to inadvertent failure of appellate counsel to raise claim found as bar to federal
habeas corpus review); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (successive federal habeas corpus
petitions should only be entertained if they include a "colorable showing of factual innocence').
See also, ag., the 'retroactivity quartet': Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity is
threshold issue precluding federal habeas corpus review of all "new rules" of constitutional criminal
procedure unless they (1) place certain conduct outside the power of the law to proscribe or (2) are
watershed rules of constitutionally mandated procedure); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212 (1990)
("new rule" as contemplated by Teague is any ruling about which reasonable jurist might differ); Saffle
v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (same, applying Butler"new rule" standard to death penalty sentencing
phase jury instruction claims); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990) (constitutional proscription
against prosecutors or trial courts from diminishing capital sentencing phase juror's sense of
responsibility Teague barred as "new rule" not contemplated by either exception).
See generalty Weisberg, A Great Writ Jhile it Lasted, 81. CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1990).
Professor Weisberg's article includes a fine treatment of the Rehnquist Court's creation and
development of retroactivity as a federal habeas corpus gatekeeper-precluding almost every arguably
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Constitution to death penalty cases.
D. McCleskey v. Kemp: ToleratingInjustice
The discriminatory impact of race on decisions of who was prosecuted,
convicted, and executed under state death penalty schemes had been an open
issue in death penalty cases since Furman v. Georgia.7 Justice Douglas,
concurring in the Court's result, rested his conclusion that the death penalty, as
then imposed, violated the eighth amendment largely on the racially discriminatory aspects of capital conviction and sentencing.2 After the re-institution of
the death penalty across the country in 1976, the issue of whether the new
death penalty statutes were applied in a racially discriminatory fashion was long
the subject of speculation. In the 1986 term, the Supreme Court finally
addressed the issue in McCleskey v. Kemp.mC The petitioner, Warren McCleskey, claimed that the Georgia death penalty statute, first found constitutional
in Gregg v. Georgia,' was applied in a racially discriminatory fashion in
violation of the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the eighth amendment
and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mr. McCleskey
also came to Court with the sophisticated statistical evidence to prove his
claim.'

"new law" claim from even being considered by federal courts.
297. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See .supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.

298. Id at 240, 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). "[The death penalty laws before the Court] are
pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id. at 257.
299. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
300. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
301. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
302.
In support of his claim, McCleskey proffered a statistical study performed by Professors
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (the Baldus study).... The
Baldus study is actually two sophisticated statistical studies that examine over 2,000
murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970's. The raw numbers collected
by Professor Baldus indicate that defendants charged with killing white persons received
the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks
received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases....
Baldus also divided the cases according to the combination of the race of the
defendant and the race of the victim. He found that the death penalty was assessed in
22% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases
involving white defendants and white victims; 1% of the cases involving black
defendants and black victims; and 3% of the cases involving white defendants and black
victims. Similarly, Baldus found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of
the cases involving black defendants and whitevictims; 32% of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants and black
victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims.
Baldus subjected his data to an extensive analysis, taking account of 230 variables
that could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds. One of his models
concludes that, even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged
with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as
defendants charged with killing blacks. According to this model, black defendants were
1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants. Thus, the Baldus
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Many other commentators and authors have considered the majority's results
in McCleskey.3 This Article will not attempt to analyze all the arguments that
composed the majority's position or the various stances of the dissenting
Justices. It will, instead, analyze the structure, intent, and effect of Justice
Brennan's dissent. To understand the value of the dissent, however, a brief
overview of McCleskey's claims and the majority's disposal of them is necessary.
-0
McCleskey presented two claims to the Court: first, that the Baldus study '
showed that the Georgia capital punishment scheme violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment;3 and second, that the Baldus
study demonstrated that the Georgia capital sentencing scheme violated the
"cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the eighth amendment.0 The
majority cast these claims as "whether a complex statistical study that indicates
a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations
proves that petitioner McCleskey's capital sentence is unconstitutional under the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. " 07 By using the words "risk" and "prove"
in their construction of McCleskey's claims, the Court was free to deny them.3
The majority, led by Justice Powell, began its analysis of McCleskey's claims
with the equal protection arguments.30 The Court placed the burden of
proving the existence of purposeful racial discrimination on McCleskey. 310 The

study indicates that black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have
the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87 (footnote omitted).
303. See, ag., Comment, Too Much Justice: A LegislativeResponse to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24
HAv. C.R.-C.LL. REv. 437 (1989); Bynam, Eighth and FourteenthAmendments-The DeathPenalty
Survives, 78 . CIUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1080 (1988); Note, Coming Full Circle:A Return to Arbiltraty

Sentencing Patternsin CapitalPunishment Cases, 56 U.M.K.C. L. R-v. 387 (1988); Note, McCleskey
v. Kemp: Racism and the DeathPenalty, 20 CONN. L RE,. 1029 (1988); Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:
Race, CapitalPunishmen; and the Supreme Cour 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388 (1988).
Further, for the interested, the entire Baldus study, complete with analysis of death penalty
jurisprudence in relation to claims of racial discriminatory impact, has been recently published, D.
BALDUS, G. WooDwoRTH & C. PULASKI, EQUAL JustncF AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990)
[hereinafter BALDMS].
304. See BALDUS, supra note 303. See also supra note 302 and accompanying text.
305. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291.
306. Id. at 299.
307. Id. at 282-83.
308. Id. "Even a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the Baldus study can only
demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a
necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision." Id. at 291 n.7
(emphasis in original).
"Risk" was the very basis of Furnan's censure of all then-existing death penalties. None of the
petitioners in Furmanwere required to "prove" that arbitrary and capricious factors entered into their
specific sentencing decision. Further, aside from Justice Douglas' anecdotal comments about the
discriminatory impact race and class have had on death penalty sentencing, the court did not even
treat the issue of proof of arbitrariness. Each of the concurring Justices assumed the proof in the
result.
309. Id. at 291. The Court characterized the basis of McCleskey's claims as "persons who
murder whites are more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who murder blacks, and black
murderers are more likely to be sentenced to death than white murderers:' Id. (footnote omitted).
310. Id. at 292.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990

59

California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 2, Art. 3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 27

specific translation of that burden to this case was that "to prevail under the
Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his
case acted with discriminatory purpose."31' McCleskey presented "no evidence
specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial considerations 31played a part in his sentence. Instead, he relie[d] solely on the Baldus
study." 2

Although the Court conceded that such blatant statistical disparities based on
race were sufficient proof in other contexts, 31 it was unwilling to extend that
analysis to situations where a person's life was at stake. 314 Relying on the
"nature of the capital sentencing decision,"31 particularly the involvement of
different jurors in each case,3 16 the Court concluded that statistical analysis, like
that accepted in other equal protection clause3 17challenges, would not be viable
proof in the death penalty sentencing context
The Court supported this rejection on the further grounds that it would be
difficult to rebut the assumption created by the statistics because jurors could
not testify about the motives of their verdicts318 and prosecutors should not
have to.319 Moreover, the Court concluded that "absent far stronger proof, it
is unnecessary to seek such a rebuttal, because a legitimate and unchallenged
explanation for the decision is apparent from the record: McCleskey committed
an act for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit
imposition of the death penalty."32° Therefore, McCleskey's lack of factual
32 1

innocence for the underlying offense negated obvious discriminatory impact.

The fact of guilt and the importance of discretion in the criminal justice

system 3" defeated McCleskey's equal protection clause claim. 3

The majority, with similar underlying reasoning, also denied McCleskey's

311.

Id. (emphasis in original).

312. I at 292-93 (footnote omitted).
313. Id at 293-94. Specifically, the Court refers to claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
314. I
315. Id

316. Id
317. Id at 295.
318. Id at 296.
319. Id
320. Id at 296-97 (footnote omitted).
321. The Court seemed to utterly confuse the guilt determination with the punishment decision.
McCleskey did not challenge the fact of his conviction, only the fact that he, as a black man who was
involved in the killing of a white man, had to die for the crime.
322. "Implementation of these laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments. Because
discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof
before we would infer that the discretion has been abused." Id. at 279.
323. The Court also dismissed McCleskey's argument that the Georgia legislature, by allowing
the discriminatory death penalty system to continue, were the actors properly accountable under the
Equal Protection Clause. Relying on the Court's 1976 pronouncement that the Georgia statute was
facially constitutional in Greggv. Georgia,the Court concluded that "[t]here was no evidence then, and
there is none now, that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital punishment statute to further a
racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 298 (footnote omitted).
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eighth amendment claim. The Court began with a short history of eighth
amendment jurisprudence 24 in which it noted that Furman held that "the death
penalty was so irrationally imposed that any particular death sentence could be
presumed excessive."32s The Court then discussed the decision in Gregg, reinstating the death penalty in the United States and, more particularly,
upholding the specific death penalty statutory protections that Georgia had
enacted in response to Furman which limited the state's discretion. z The
Court also mentioned the other co-equal development of eighth amendment
death penalty jurisprudence which required full consideration by the sentencer
of the nature
of the offense, and the record and character of the individual
3 7
before it.
McCleskey first claimed that the racial disparities shown by the Baldus study,
and accepted as accurate by the Court, proved that the death penalty was
disproportionally applied to black individuals like himself.328 The Court held
that Georgia's perfunctory 'proportionality review' precluded his claim that "his
case differs from other cases in which defendants did receive the death
penalty."329 Further, the Court stated that "absent a showing that the Georgia
capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner,
McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other
defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty."330
In the end, because the Court had upheld the facial constitutionality of the
Georgia death penalty scheme a decade earlier in Gregg, it concluded that

McCleskey's sentence was not "disproportionate within any recognized meaning

under the Eighth Amendment."331
The Court thereafter addressed the heart of McCleskey's claim: "[The Georgia
capital punishment system is arbitrary and capricious in application, and
therefore his sentence is excessive, because racial considerations may influence
capital sentencing decisions in Georgia." 332 The Court returned to their equal

324. Id at 299-305.
325.

Id at 301.

326. Id at 302-03.
327. Id at 303-05. "Incontrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's
discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a
sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death
sentence." Id at 304 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Again, it is important to point out
that McCleskey's claim had no bearing on the issues of mitigation evidence or the ability to decline
to impose. Rather, McCleskey's claim was that the imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment because race unconstitutionally tainted the sentencing decision.
328. Id at 307.
329. Id at 306 (emphasis in original).
330. Id at 306-07 (emphasis in original).
331. Id at 308.
332. Id (emphasis in original). "At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears
to correlate with race." Id. at 312. Reminiscent of Justice Harlan's position in McGautha (see supra
note 77 and accompanying text) the Court concludes that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system." Id (footnote omitted).
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protection analysis of "risk" and "proof3 33 and initially claimed that "[e]ven
Professor Baldus does not contend that his statisticsprove that race enters into
any capital sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's
particular case."n 4 The majority then mentioned that many cases were decided
based on the possible "risk" of race discrimination infection of criminal
proceedings.335 However, the Court weighed these prior cases which sought to
ferret out and eliminate racial discrimination in criminal proceedings against the
tolerance of discretion in criminal justice administration: "McCleskey's argument
that the Constitution condemns the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the
Georgia capital sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of
discretion in our criminal justice system."336 Because discretion was "fundamental" to the criminal justice337system, the Court declined to "assume that what is
unexplained is invidious."
In rejecting McCleskey's eighth amendment claim, the Court also considered
"[t]wo additional concerns" that informed its decision. 338 The first was that
"McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question
the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. "339 This
conclusion led the Court to worry that "if we accepted McCleskey's claim that
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could
soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty."m The Court
also worried that if they accepted McCleskey's claim regarding race, it might
later be faced with claims that related to "membership in other minority groups,
and even to gender."3 1 In short, the Court adopted a "slippery slope" analysis
to conclude that a decision in McCleskey's favor would result in too many
claims.4
The second "concern" that informed the Court's decision was Supreme Court
judicial deference to the legislature of Georgia. 3 The Court felt that once it
had determined a decade earlier in Gregg that the Georgia death-penalty scheme

333. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text.
334. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 408 (emphasis in original).
335. Id at 309-11 (citing, inter alia, Turnerv. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (requiring trial courts
to question capital jurors about race bias in mixed-race capital trials); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986) (prohibiting the use of prosecution peremptory challenges on the basis of race)).
336. Id at 311. Although Warren McCleskey might disagree, at least insofar as his racially
based death sentence was a product of "discretion," the Court comforted all by noting: "Discretion
in the criminal justice system offers substantial benefits to the criminal defendant. Not only can a
jury decline to impose the death sentence, it can decline to convict or choose to convict of a lesser
offense." Id Again, this misses the point of McCleskey's argument that the imposition of the death
penalty violated the eighth amendment because of the unconstitutional factor, race.
337. Id at 313.
338. Id at 314.
339. Irdat 314-15,
340. Id at 315 (footnote omitted).
341. Id at 316-17 (footnotes omitted).
342. Id at 318. "As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting principle to the type of
challenge brought by McCleskey." Id (footnote omitted).
343. Id at 319.
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was facially constitutional, then there was nothing left for it to do. 4 Based on
these two concerns and the Court's holding that the Baldus study did not "prove"
enough, the Court denied McCleskey's claim, and in so doing silently suported
the racial disparities present in the Georgia capital punishment scheme.
Justice Brennan's dissent in McCleskey w was one of the finest opinions ever
written by a member of the Court. He began with humble purpose: "I write
separately to emphasize how conclusively McCleskey has . . . demonstrated
precisely the type of risk of irrationality in sentencing that we have consistently
condemned in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."347 He built a strong
defense of the principles of rationality and reviewability and was able to instill
power inthat statement. Even the majority swayed to Justice Brennan's rhetoric
and declared it "eloquent."m It was a dissent that accomplished all three goals
of the genre:349 it illuminated the errors in the majority opinion, it narrowed
and offered direction to other courts and future litigants, and, more than all else,
it stood as the impassioned statement of one Justice who was willing to say,
"Here I draw the line."350 The dissent spoke to the major constitutional issues
implicated by McCleskey's claim and proof, but most impressively, it spoke to
the individual-all individuals-whose constitutional rights were in some way
demeaned by the majority's holding.
Justice Brennan began not with the law, but with the man:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his

344.
345.

Id.
The majority opinion nowhere condemns racial disparity in imposing the death penalty.

346.

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.,and Blackmun

& Stevens, JJ., in part).
347. Id. at 320-21. Justice Brennan's dissent in McCleskey dealt almost exclusively with the
eighth amendment implications of the Court's decision. Justice Brennan joined Justice Blackmun's
complete dissenting opinion on the Equal Protection Clause aspects of the case. See id. at 345
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
348. It. at 313 n.37. The majority spends nearly three pages on a footnote responding to Justice
Brennan's argument. The majority ends their answer to Justice Brennan's dissent by reiterating their
argument that facial constitutionality is all the Court can require or hope for.
[N]o suggestion is made as to how greater "rationality' could be achieved under any
type of statute that authorizes capital punishment. The Gregg-type statute imposes
unprecedented safeguards in the special context of capital punishment. These include:
(i) a bifurcated sentencing proceeding; (ii) the threshold requirement of one or more
aggravating circumstances; and (iii) mandatory State Supreme Court review. All of
these are administered pursuant to this Court's decisions interpreting the limits of the
Eighth Amendment on the imposition of the death penalty, and all are subject to
ultimate review by this Court. These ensure a degree of care in the imposition of the
sentence of death that can be described only as unique. Given these safeguards already
inherent in the imposition and review of capital sentences, the dissent's call for greater
rationality is no less than a claim that a capital punishment system cannot be
administered in accord with the Constitution.
Id. at 315 n.37.
349. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid
reply to this question would have been disturbing. First, counsel
would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the crime or
of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were more important than the
fact that his victim was white. Furthermore, counsel would feel
bound to tell McCleskey that defendants charged with killing white
victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as
defendants charged with killing blacks. In addition, frankness would
compel the disclosure that it was more likely than not that the race.
of McCleskey's victim would determine whether he received a death
sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants convicted of killing a white person
would not have received the death penalty if their victims had been
black.., while, among defendants with aggravating and mitigating
factors comparable to McCleskey's, 20 of every 34 would not have
been sentenced to die if their victims had been black. Finally, the
assessment would not be complete without the information that cases
involving black defendants and white victims are more likely to result
in a death sentence than cases featuring any other racial combination
of defendant and victim. The story could be told in a variety of ways,
but McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential narrative line:
there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role
in determining if he lived or died."5 '
These truths stood in stark contrast to the majority's discussion which assiduously avoided considering McCleskey's individual situation. Justice Brennan
delivered the individual for whom the Constitution was created to protect.
After introducing McCleskey and his plight, Justice Brennan turned to the
majority's conclusion: "The Court today holds that Warren McCleskey's sentence
was constitutionally imposed. It finds no fault in a system in which lawyers must
tell their clients that race casts a large shadow on the capital sentencing
process."3 52 He then outlined the basis of the majority's conclusion:
The Court reaches this conclusion by placing four factors on the
scales opposite McCleskey's evidence: the desire to encourage
sentencing discretion, the existence of "statutory safeguards" in the
Georgia scheme, the fear of encouraging widespread challenges
3 3 to
other sentencing decisions, and the limits of the judicial role. 5
These factors alone, however, were not the only considerations preventing
McCleskey from prevailing. Justice Brennan began his assault on the Court's
reasoning by exposing the constitutional error of applying a "risk" and "proof'

351.

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321 (citations omitted).

352.

Id at 321-22.

353.

L at 322 (citation omitted).
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analysis to eighth amendment claims: "It is important to emphasize at the outset
that the Court's observation that McCleskey cannot prove the influence of race
on any particular sentencing decision is irrelevant in evaluating his Eighth
Amendment claim. Since Furman,... the Court has been concerned with the
risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the proven fact of
one."3 4 The "risk" and "proof" analysis, while perhaps appropriate to the equal
protection claims urged by McCleskey, were not appropriate for analyzing claims
regarding the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty:
While the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial discrimination, and
intent may be critical in a successful claim under that provision, the
Eighth Amendment has its own distinct focus: whether punishment
comports with social standards of rationality and decency. It may be,
as in this case, that on occasion an influence that makes punishment
arbitrary is also proscribed under another constitutional provision.
That does not mean, however, that the standard for determining an
Eighth Amendment violation is superseded by the standard for
determining a violation under this other provision. Thus, the fact
that McCleskey presents a viable equal protection claim does not
require that he demonstrate intentional racial discrimination to
establish his Eighth Amendment claim. 355
McCleskey's eighth amendment claim, properly considered, required no "proof'
of discrimination or arbitrary imposition, but needed only show that such a "risk"
existed.356 Justice Brennan pointed out that, unlike previous cases, including
Furman, McCleskey's claim differed "in one respect from these earlier cases: it
is the first to base a challenge not on speculation about how a system might
operate, but on empirical documentation of how it does operate. "35 7 The
statistical conclusions of the Baldus study3 58 and "human experience" combined
for Justice Brennan to reveal that "the risk that race influenced McCleskey's
sentence [was] intolerable by any imaginable standard."359

354. Id at 322 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
355. Id at 323 n.1.
356. Id at 324. "Defendants challenging their death sentences thus never have had to prove that
impermissible considerations have actually infected sentencing decisions. We have required instead
that they establish that the system under which they were sentenced posed a significant risk of such
an occurrence." Id

357. Id (emphasis in original).
358. See id. at 326-27. "The capital sentencing rate for all white-victim cases was almost 11
times greater than the rate for black-victim cases. Furthermore, blacks who kill whites are sentenced
to death at nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of whites.

who kill blacks. In addition, prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70% of black defendants with
white victims, but for only 15% of black defendants with black victims, and only 19% of white
defendants with black victims." Id (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). These statistics led
Justice Brennan to conclude: "The statistical evidence in this case thus relentlessly documents the risk
that McCleskey's sentence was influenced by racial considerations:' Id at 328.

359. Id at 325.
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Justice Brennan, having emphasized his conclusion, analyzed the stated basis
for the majority's holding. He started by attacking the Court's first rationale-that discretion in the criminal justice system is "fundamental." Justice
Brennan declared what should not need saying: "Discretion is a means, not an
end."30 The mere fact that discretion was a part of a system had not, before
McCleskey, been a barrier to claims of racial discrimination. 6 ' If race was
allowed to be part of the discretion employed by actors in the criminal justice
system 62 then the eighth amendment requirement of individualized sentencing
was negated:
Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if the death
penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with this concern
that an individual be evaluated as a unique human being. Decisions
influenced by race rest in part on a categorical assessment of the
worth of human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever
qualities the individuals in question may possess. Enhanced willingness to impose the death sentence on black defendants, or diminished
willingness to render such a sentence when blacks are victims, reflects
a devaluation of the lives of black persons. When confronted with
evidence that race more likely than not plays such a role in a capital
sentencing system, it is plainly insufficient to say that the importance
of discretion demands that the risk be higher before we will act-for
in such a case the very end that discretion is designed to serve is
being undermined.m3
In the majority's rush to embrace discretion, justice was lost.
Regarding the Court's rejection of McCleskey's claim based on the 1976
acceptance of Georgia's death penalty scheme in Gregg, Justice Brennan pointed

360. Id. at 336.
361. See, e&, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Decided a term before McClevkey, the
Court in Batson held that the prosecutors could not exercise peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory fashion. This was despite the fact that peremptory challenges were traditionally
discretionary and previously required neither rhyme nor reason to explain their exercise. See also
MeCleskey, 481 U.S. at 337.
362. Justice Brennan was particularly concerned with the racial disparities implied by the Baldus
study as they related to prosecutorial discretion:
Since Gregg v. Georgia, the Court's death penalty jurisprudence has rested on the
premise that it is possible to establish a system of guided discretion that will both permit
individualized moral evaluation and prevent impermissible considerations from being
taken into account. As Justice Blackmun has persuasively demonstrated, Georgia
provides no systematic guidelines for prosecutors to utilize in determining for which

defendants the death penalty should be sought. Furthermore, whether a State has
chosen an effective combination of guidance and discretion in its capital sentencing
system as a whole cannot be established in the abstract, as the Court insists on doing,
but must be determined empirically, as the Baldus study has done."
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 334 n.9 (citations omitted).
363. Id. at 336.
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out that "Gregg bestowed no permanent approval on the Georgia system. It
simply held that the State's statutory safeguards were assumed sufficient to
channel discretion without evidence otherwise." 5 McCleskey's evidence was
"not speculative or theoretical: it [was] empirical,"m and called into question
the "very effectiveness of those [statutory] safeguards"3 upon which the
majority now relied.
Justice Brennan's dissent, though, was most effective and most impassioned,.
when discussing the majority's slippery slope nightmares of possible future
claims:
The Court next states that its unwillingness to regard petitioner's
evidence as sufficient is based in part on the fear that recognition of
McCleskey's claim would open the door to widespread challenges to
all aspects of criminal sentencing. Taken on its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.3 7
The majority's fear of litigation regarding all aspects of the criminal justice
system ignored the very constitutional difference that caused the death penalty
to fall within the eighth amendment proscription. Justice Brennan made clear
upon what sleight of hand the majority's "fear" relied:
Yet to reject McCleskey's powerful evidence on this basis is to ignore
both the qualitatively different character of the death penalty and the
particular repugnance of racial discrimination, considerations which
may properly be taken into account in determining whether various
punishments are "cruel and unusual."m
Justice Brennan again returned to the individual whose constitutional rights were
at stake:
The marginal benefits accruing to the state from obtaining the death
penalty rather than life imprisonment are considerably less than the
marginal difference to the defendant between death and life in prison.
Such a disparity is an additional reason for tolerating scant arbitrariness in capital sentencing. Even those who believe that society can
impose the death penalty in a manner sufficiently rational to justify
its continuation must acknowledge that the level of rationality that

364.

365.
366.
367.
368.

It1 at 338.
Id
Id
Id at 339.
Id at 339-40.
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is considered satisfactory must be uniquely high." 9
The fear of the great flood of litigation seeking racial parity was necessarily
based on the majority's own belief that a right, never before articulated, would
be created from granting McCleskey relief. The possibility that the Court would
expand, however slightly, the rights of criminal defendants, particularly those who
have been sentenced to die, should not be the basis for denying that an
individual was constitutionally wronged. For the majority to reach this
conclusion required feigned ignorance of eighth amendment principles that
govern capital punishment. Justice Brennan observed: "The Court's projection
of apocalyptic consequences for criminal sentencing is thus greatly exaggerated.
The Court can indulge in such speculation only by ignoring its own
70 jurisprudence
demanding the highest scrutiny on issues of death and race."3
Finally, Justice Brennan, in answering the majority's deference to state
legislatures in these matters, presented his long held view that courts, particularly federal courts, are uniquely situated to vindicate the constitutional rights of
the individual. Persons on death row are among the most vilified individuals in
our society. They have been judged by the state as dispensable and are without
political power of any moment. Justice Brennan recognized that the Constitution, and the federal system it spawned, has as its primary purpose the protection
of minority and individual rights:
Those whom we would banish from society or from the human
community itself often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above
society's demand for punishment. It is the particular role of courts
to hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that the majoritanan chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social life.371
Justice Brennan did not contain his dissent to attacking the majority position.
He also engaged in a short discussion of the history of racial discrimination in
this country.372 The fact of our country's racially divided past only supported
the evidence that McCleskey presented. The history of this country's struggles
to free itself from racism did not end with Gregg, and its lesson, for Justice
Brennan, was a humanizing and humbling one:
[I]t has been scarcely a generation since this Court's first decision
striking down racial segregation, and barely two decades since the
legislative prohibition of racial discrimination in major domains of
national life. These have been honorable steps, but we cannot
pretend that in three decades we have completely escaped the grip of

369. I at 340.
370.
371.
372.

Id at 342.
Id at 343.
Id at 343-44.
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a historical legacy spanning centuries. Warren McCleskey's evidence
confronts us with the subtle and persistent influence of the past. His
message is a disturbing one to a society that has formally repudiated
racism, and a frustrating one to a Nation accustomed to regarding its
destiny as the product of its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him at
our peril, for we remain imprisoned
by the past as long as we deny
3
its influence in the present.

Justice Brennan, at the end of his dissent, returned to McCleskey and all other
defendants awaiting their trial for life to finally impress the scope of the injustice
wrought by the majority's decision:
It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in
no way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no
echoes beyond the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is
ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so
easily confined....
The Court's decision today will not change what attorneys in
Georgia tell other Warren McCleskeys about their chances of
execution. Nothing will soften the harsh message they must convey,
nor alter the prospect that race undoubtedly will continue to be a
topic of discussion. McCleskey's evidence will not have obtained
judicial acceptance, but that will not affect what is said on death row.
However many criticisms of today's decision may be rendered, these
painful conversations will serve as the most eloquent dissents of
all.374
CONCLUSION

Justice Brennan continued his stolid stance in opposition to the death penalty
and in opposition to the erosion of the right to federal habeas corpus review.
During the last few days of the 1989 Term, only a month before his resignation,
the Court was presented with the final claims on behalf of a Texas death
sentenced inmate who was scheduled to die within hours.37s James Smith was
an inmate who had decided to forego any further appeals.376 Because serious
questions remained about his mental competence to make such a momentous
decision, litigation proceeded on behalf of his mother, Alexzene Hamilton, who
wished to see her son remain alive.377 Typical of such pre-execution litigation,
there was little time for full argument or consideration of Hamilton's claims.
373.

374.
375.

Id at 344.
Id at 344-45.
See Hamilton v. Texas, 110 S. Ct. 3262 (1990) (Brennan. J., dissenting from denial of

application for stay).
376. Id
377. I
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The Court received and conferenced the case just hours before his scheduled

execution. Justice Brennan related what then happened: "[Flour Members of
this Court have voted to grant certiorari in this case, but because a stay cannot
be entered without five votes, the execution cannot be halted. For the first time
in recent memory, a man will be executed after the Court has decided to hear his
claim."378 Justice Brennan's dissent focussed on two issues: the meager state
proceedings at which James Smith's competency was determined, 37 and the
failure of the federal district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues
presented in the Ms. Hamilton's pleadings.
Although three other Justices
agreed, at the very least, with Justice Brennan's assessment that the issues
1
presented warranted full consideration by the Court,ms
no fifth vote was

asserted to stay the execution. The issues were rendered moot by Mr. Smith's
execution23 Although Justice Brennan was not able to prevent the execution
of James Smith, he was present to witness what he perceived as injustice. He
was also present as a Supreme Court Justice to record that event for the future.
Justice Brennan is no longer sitting on the Court. His time-his era-is over.
The worth of what Mr. William Brennan Jr., the man, has given this country as
Justice Brennan, scarcely can be figured by this generation. The Constitution,
with its flexibility and adaptability, will certainly see many changes in the next
200-odd years. Many are presently unforeseeable. Some will likely be the
product of a fresh look at Justice Brennan's words.

378. Id at 3262-63.
379. Id. at 3263-64. Justice Brennan related:
The state trial court held a hearing to determine Smith's competency, a hearing which seems to
have been little more than a nonadversarial, exparte chat among the trial judge, the prosecutor,
and Smith. The hearing was scheduled without notice to Smith's mother and next friend, Ms.
Alexzene Hamilton, despite the fact that Ms. Hamilton had appeared as petitioner on Smith's
behalf as early as May 7, 1988.... Smith was unrepresented by counsel ....There was no
cross-examination at the hearing. No evidence was received beyond the bare reports of a Harris
County psychiatrist and a Harris County psychologist who did not perform psychological tests
and who were not given access to several reports of the history of Smith's mental illness,
including the fact that he had been found not guilty by reason of insanity of a prior Florida
robbery.
Id. at 3263.
380. Id. at 3264:
Regardless of a State's obligation to provide a competency hearing, it is clearly error for a
federal court to accord deference to state-court findings when the state hearing is procedurally
inadequate. A federal court is obliged to hold its own evidentiary hearing on habeas corpus if,
among other factors, "the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing, " 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); or "the material facts were not
adequately developed at the State court hearing," § 2254(d)(3), or "the applicant did not receive
a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding." § 2254(d)(6). This case
presents the important legal question of the procedures required to determine the competence
of a prisoner to forgo further appeals, a question which has relevance both for state courts and
for federal courts reviewing the state-court findings on habeas corpus.
381. See Hamilton v. Texas, 111 S.Ct. 281 (1990) (opinions of Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
J3., dissenting).
382. Id.
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In the application of the Constitution to the administration of the death
penalty in this country, Justice Brennan has given much for future generations
to consider. In embracing the position that the death penalty is unconstitutional
under all circumstances, Justice Brennan recognized the basic principle that the
This
Constitution is designed to "advance, not degrade, human dignity."3
primary purpose of the Constitution is premised on his firm faith in egalitarian
beginnings. Each person borne into the human conunm,ity must be considered,
for the Constitution to function, equal to each other person. This primary belief
is necessary to the very existence of constitutional government, for the
alternative position is the people are somehow different-of differing situation,
or intelligence, or class, or race, or religion-and therefore of differing worth.
The idea that people are intrinsically "other" immediately allows those with
power and those in the majority to define relative value. This is the root of
bigotry, racism, sexism, classism, etc., and is antithetical to the Constitution's
continued existence.
For the state to kill another person it must first purposefully negate the
constitutional premise that all persons are created equal. To blame the
condemned for their imminent execution ignores the fact that entry, membership,
and participation in the human community are not voluntary acts of individual
will. They are, rather, the product of chance. The Constitution, to function,
must accept this chance without judgment and afford equal rights, protections,
and privileges to all who live under its shelter. To ignore the chance circumstances that create the differences among people in our society ultimately ignores
our own frailties and our own humanity.
The conclusion that someone is no longer fit to continue as a member of the
human community requires a judgment not acceptable to the functioning of an
egalitarian, constitutional society. This basic view of constitutional government
is what propelled Justice Brennan to conclude that "the state, even as it
punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth
as human beings."3' The death penalty simply denies that intrinsic worth.
Future Justices, future Courts, may come to accept Justice Brennan's firm
belief in this society's need for protections of the individual through full federal
review of constitutional claims in an open federal habeas corpus forum. These
women and men may even ultimately accept and apply his position that the
Constitution precludes the death penalty in all circumstances. If they chose not
to, they would do well to at least hold fast to Justice Brennan's confidence in the
dignity of the individual and his belief that the Constitution was born of the
intent to secure the intrinsic worth of humanity against all offenders.

383.
384.

See Brennan, supra note 193, at 436.
Id.
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